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WHY SO CONTRIVED?  
FOURTH AMENDMENT BALANCING,  
PER SE RULES, AND  
DNA DATABASES AFTER  
MARYLAND V. KING 
DAVID H. KAYE* 
 
In Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013), the Supreme Court 
narrowly upheld the constitutionality of routine collection and storage of 
DNA samples and profiles from arrestees.  In doing so, it stepped outside 
the usual framework that treats warrantless searches as per se 
unconstitutional unless they fall within specified exceptions to the warrant 
and probable cause requirements.  Instead, the Court balanced various 
individual and state interests.  Yet, as regards the state interests, the Court 
confined this direct balancing analysis to the perceived value of using DNA 
to inform certain pretrial decisions.  Oddly, it avoided relying directly on 
DNA’s more obvious value in generating investigative leads in unsolved 
crimes.  
This Article suggests that this contrived analysis resulted from the 
structure of existing Fourth Amendment case law (and perhaps a desire to 
avoid intimating that a more egalitarian and extensive DNA database 
system also would be constitutional).  It demonstrates that the opinion does 
not support a “no lines” system of ad hoc judgments about the 
reasonableness of every search using the totality of the circumstances.  
Recognizing that the existing framework of categorical exceptions to the 
warrant requirement diverges from an older “warrant preference” rule that 
demands a warrant whenever feasible, the Article shows that King leaves 
the current per se framework largely intact. 
 
* Distinguished Professor of Law and Weiss Family Scholar, and Graduate Faculty 
Member, Program in Forensic Science, The Pennsylvania State University.  A draft of this 
Article was presented at the Stanford Law and Biosciences Workshop.  I am grateful to Hank 
Greely, Jake Sherkow, and other workshop participants for their comments, to Jesse Choper 
for discussion of Maryland v. King, and to Sihan Wang for research assistance. 
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Nevertheless, this Article questions the resort to direct balancing. It 
presents a more coherent doctrinal framework for scrutinizing not just DNA 
profiling, but all forms of biometric data collection and analysis. In this 
regard, it notes that the dissenting King opinion overstates the differences 
between fingerprinting and DNA profiling as currently practiced.  Finally, 
it suggests that the cramped reasoning in both opinions limits the 
implications of the case for more aggressive DNA database laws—ones that 
cover more crimes, more people, more loci, and more methods for 
acquiring DNA samples. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Maryland v. King,1 the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional 
challenge to the practice of routinely collecting DNA from arrested 
individuals.2  A bare majority of five Justices effusively endorsed the 
 
1 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
2 Id. at 1980.  A similar but shorter description of the case than the one provided here can 
be found in David H. Kaye, What the Supreme Court Hasn’t Told You About DNA 
Databases, PROMEGA CORP. (2013), available at http://goo.gl/CkjEVy. 
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acquisition of DNA samples for “identification” before conviction (DNA-
BC).3  In response, four dissenting Justices called the opinion a precedent-
shattering and “scary”4 foundation for “the construction of . . . a genetic 
panopticon”5 that could gaze into the DNA of airline travelers, motorists, 
and public school students.6 
The case began when police in Maryland arrested Alonzo King for 
menacing people with a shotgun.7  Following the arrest, they took his 
picture, recorded his fingerprints—and swabbed the inside of his cheeks.8  
When checked against Maryland’s DNA database, his DNA profile led to 
the discovery that six years earlier, King had held a gun to the head of a 
fifty-three-year-old woman and raped her.9  Before the DNA match, the 
police had no reason to suspect King of that crime.  Lacking probable 
cause—or even reasonable suspicion—they did not rely on a judicial order 
to swab his cheek.  They relied on a state law that mandated collection of 
DNA from all people charged with a crime of violence or burglary.10 
King appealed the resulting rape conviction.11  He argued that the 
DNA collection deprived him of the right, guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution, to be free from unreasonable searches or 
seizures.12  Maryland’s highest court agreed.13  It held that except in the 
rarest of circumstances where a suspect’s true identity could not be 
established by conventional methods—the court gave the example of a face 
transplant14—forcing an arrestee to submit to DNA sampling was 
unconstitutional.15 
The state petitioned the Supreme Court for review.16  Over and over, 
the Court had denied requests from convicted offenders and, more recently, 
 
3 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966 (“The advent of DNA technology is one of the most 
significant scientific advancements of our era.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 52, 
61, and 72. 
4 Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 1966 (majority opinion). 
8 Id. 
9 See King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 553–54 (Md. 2012). 
10 Id. at 552, 553; see also MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 2-504(a)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 
2011). 
11 King, 42 A.3d at 555. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. at 555–56. 
14 Id. at 580 n.35. 
15 See id. at 580. 
16 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (granting a 
stay of judgment pending a likely grant of certiorari). 
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from arrestees to address the legality of state and federal laws mandating 
routine collection of their DNA.  But this case was different.  Never before 
had a state supreme court or a federal appellate court deemed a DNA 
database law unconstitutional.17  Even before the Court met to consider 
whether it would review the case, Chief Justice John Roberts stayed the 
Maryland judgment.18  His chambers opinion stated “there is a fair prospect 
that this Court will reverse the decision below”19 and found that “the 
decision below subjects Maryland to ongoing irreparable harm.”20 
The Chief Justice’s prediction proved correct.  But the margin of 
victory was as narrow as it could be, and the majority opinion leaves 
important questions unresolved.  Moreover, the dissenting Justices issued a 
biting opinion importuning the Court “some day”21 to repudiate its 
“incursion upon the Fourth Amendment.”22  Indeed, when Justice Anthony 
Kennedy announced the opinion of the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia 
invoked the rare practice of reading a dissent aloud.  For eleven minutes, he 
mocked the majority’s defense of Maryland’s law as a means of identifying 
arrestees.23  “[I]f the Court’s identification theory is not wrong, there is no 
such thing as error,” he railed.24  As he and the three Justices who joined his 
dissenting opinion (Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and 
Elena Kagan) saw it, the majority’s reasoning “taxes the credulity of the 
credulous.”25 
 
17 See David H. Kaye, On the “Considered Analysis” of Collecting DNA Before 
Conviction, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 104, 106 (2013) [hereinafter Kaye, “Considered 
Analysis”].  The only appellate defeat before 2012 came in In re C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2006).  See David H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Collection Before 
Conviction: An Updated Scorecard, FORENSIC SCI. STATISTICS & LAW (Mar. 30, 2013), 
http://goo.gl/D4b4Dl (listing earlier cases in which courts found DNA database laws 
constitutional). 
18 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 3. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  The Chief Justice maintained that “[a]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from 
effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable 
injury.”  Id. (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)).  But the notion that every court order that blocks 
enforcement of a duly enacted law works an irreparable injury seems extravagant.  See 
David H. Kaye, Supreme Court to Review DNA Swabbing on Arrest??, FORENSIC SCI. 
STATISTICS & LAW (July 31, 2012), http://goo.gl/ugxcaG. 
21 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1990 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
22 Id. at 1989–90. 
23 See Joan Biskupic, Analysis: With Trademark Vigor, Justice Scalia Dissents in DNA 
Case, REUTERS (June 3, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://goo.gl/T5UhRd; Joan Biskupic, Colorful 
Dissent Is in Scalia’s DNA, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 4, 2013, 8:24 AM), 
http://goo.gl/gkalGW. 
24 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1986. 
25 Id. at 1980. 
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The popular press and bloggers seized on the dissent’s portrayal of the 
Court’s opinion.26  One trenchant journalist asked, “Why did Kennedy write 
his opinion in a way that makes him sound like the last guy on Earth to 
discover Law & Order?”27  Why indeed?  Justice Kennedy knew perfectly 
well that DNA-BC was being used to solve crimes.  That was why the Chief 
Justice had granted the stay.  It was why Justice Samuel Alito had flagged 
the case during the oral argument as “perhaps the most important criminal 
procedure case that [the Supreme] Court has heard in decades.”28  It was 
why the first words from Maryland’s Deputy Attorney General at oral 
argument were “Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Since 2009, 
when Maryland began to collect DNA samples from arrestees charged with 
violent crimes and burglary, there had been 225 matches, 75 prosecutions 
and 42 convictions, including that of Respondent King.”29 
This Article explains why Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems so 
contrived, describes more convincing (and doctrinally adequate) ways to 
analyze the constitutionality of DNA-BC, and probes the boundaries of the 
Court’s decision.  I suggest that the King Court treated the primary value of 
DNA-BC—as a crime-solving tool—as merely incidental to other functions 
because of the Court’s ambivalent jurisprudence on the propriety of 
balancing state and individual interests to ascertain the reasonableness of 
searches under the Fourth Amendment.  The majority was unwilling or 
unable to speak clearly about the category of cases in which balancing is 
permissible.  It was unwilling or unable to consider creating an express 
exception to accommodate the traditional rule that searches that do not fall 
within defined exceptions necessarily require probable cause and a 
warrant.30  As a result, the Court opened itself to the dissent’s charge of 
 
26 Professor Jeffrey Rosen called the opinion Justice Scalia’s wittiest and finest 
moment—“one of the best Fourth Amendment[] dissents, ever.”  Jeffrey Rosen, A Damning 
Dissent: Scalia’s Smartest, Wittiest Ruling of All Time, NEW REPUBLIC (June 4, 2013), 
http://goo.gl/RgQzj2.  Professor Noah Feldman agreed with the opinion’s “libertarian 
impulse.” Noah Feldman, Court’s DNA Ruling Brings U.S. a Step Closer to ‘Gattaca,’ 
BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2013, 1:12 PM), http://goo.gl/fvIM8B, but described it as a “pungent” 
declaration of “Luddite liberty,” id., “dripping with contempt,” Noah Feldman, Grumpy Old 
Scalia v. Those Pesky Kids, BLOOMBERG (June 30, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://goo.gl/qZcjfw. 
27 Emily Bazelon, They’re Coming for Your DNA, SLATE, http://goo.gl/QpebpT (last 
visited May 28, 2014). 
28 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-
207) [hereinafter Transcript]. 
29 Id. at 3.  This was as far as she got before encountering Justice Scalia’s sarcasm: 
“Well, that’s really good.  I’ll bet you if you conducted a lot of unreasonable searches and 
seizures, you’d get more convictions, too.  (Laughter.)  That proves absolutely nothing.”  Id. 
30 This possibility was noted in the state’s petition for a writ of certiorari but studiously 
ignored for the remainder of the litigation.  See infra Part II.C. 
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blinking reality and of being less than “minimally competent [in] 
English.”31 
But the dissenting opinion, I maintain, fares no better.  For all its barbs 
and jibes, its turns of phrases, and its literary allusions, the opinion points to 
no fundamental individual interest or social value that could justify so 
bilious a condemnation of DNA-BC.  It presents an oversimplified 
description of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and applies a one-size-fits-
all approach to all types of searches of the person, even though these 
searches vary greatly in their impact on legitimate individual interests and 
in their value to law enforcement. 
In short, the opinions represent a lost opportunity to clarify the law on 
balancing tests for Fourth Amendment rights and to scrutinize biometric 
data collection and analysis practices within a more coherent doctrinal 
framework.  To explain and justify this assessment, Part I describes the 
reasoning of the Justices.  It shows how the majority opinion expands an ill-
defined set of cases in which a direct balancing of interests determines the 
reasonableness of certain searches or seizures.  It also maintains that the 
dissent simply drew an arbitrary line that was compelled neither by 
precedent nor by the interests that should determine the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
Part II looks more deeply into how the Court reasoned about 
reasonableness.  It describes the existing version of the rule that searches 
without a warrant and probable cause are unreasonable without an 
applicable exception—what I call the PSUWE (per-se-unreasonable-with-
exceptions) framework.  It contrasts this framework to an earlier “warrant 
preference” rule,32 regime,33 model,34 or view35 that “the modern Court has 
 
31 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra note 53. 
32 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin & Julia Mirabella, Book Review, Framing the Fourth, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1049, 1061 (2011) (“[T]he ‘warrant preference’ rule . . . holds that a warrant 
is a necessary precondition of a reasonable search, unless there is a compelling reason for 
proceeding without one.”); David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment 
History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 584 (2008) (“According to a number of scholars, the 
Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment to impose a ‘warrant preference rule’ favoring, and 
sometimes mandating, searches pursuant to a specific warrant.”). 
33 Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 856 
n.196 (1994) (“In Professor Amar’s scheme of endlessly sliding scales of ‘reasonableness,’ the 
rigidity of probable cause has no place.  But in a warrant preference regime, a probable cause 
requirement is necessary to prevent the exceptions to the Warrant Clause from swallowing the 
rule by giving police broader power to search without warrants than with them.”). 
34 Thomas K. Clancy, The Importance of James Otis, 82 MISS. L.J. 487, 514 (2013) 
(“There are at least five principal models that the Court currently chooses from to measure 
reasonableness: the warrant preference model; the individualized suspicion model; the 
totality of the circumstances test; the balancing test; and a hybrid model giving dispositive 
weight to the common law.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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increasingly abandoned.”36  After explicating the difference between those 
two methods for analyzing warrantless searches, it argues that King does 
not obliterate the PSUWE framework.  In addition, it suggests that 
balancing within this framework to create either an exception under the 
special needs rubric or a categorical exception for certain types of biometric 
data would have been preferable to the majority’s direct resort to balancing. 
Part III shows that the opinions in King, having been forged in the 
crucible of incremental, case-by-case adjudication, do not come to grips 
with obvious variations on Maryland’s version of DNA-BC, let alone the 
most basic questions about DNA databases for law enforcement that society 
must confront.  In this Part, I try to elucidate these questions and to 
enucleate the opinions’ implications for some variations in DNA-BC 
statutes in light of likely advances in DNA science and technology.  This 
analysis requires us to attend to the nature of the DNA sequences that are, 
and might be, used in law enforcement databases, the analogy between 
anatomical biometrics and these DNA sequences, and the adequacy of 
statutory protections against the misuse of genetic information.  I conclude 
with a brief discussion of the way in which legislatures should think about 
building DNA databases for law enforcement now that the Court has issued 
a construction permit. 
I. THE COURT’S REASONING: FREE-FORM BALANCING WITH BLINDERS 
Given the facts before the Court, King determined three things: 
(1) buccal swabbing is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment; (2) the 
constitutionality of this kind of search, performed on all individuals arrested 
for serious crimes, turns on the balance of state and individual interests; and 
(3) this balance favors the state when the swabbing is done (a) after charges 
have been filed, (b) the loci tested do not reveal sensitive personal 
information, and (c) statutory and administrative privacy safeguards are in 
place.37  The first point was not in contention, as previous opinions had held 
that blood and urine sampling—indeed, even scraping a little debris from 
beneath a fingernail of a suspect38—are searches.39  The real controversies 
 
35 Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1134–35 (2012) (“For much of the twentieth 
century, the Court embraced what is called the warrant preference view of the Fourth 
Amendment under which the validity of a search turned on whether the police sought prior 
judicial authorization in the form of a warrant based on probable cause issued by a 
magistrate judge.”). 
36 Id. at 1135. 
37 See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013); infra Parts I.A–C. 
38 Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292, 295 (1973). 
39 See, e.g., id.; D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 480 (2001). 
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in the case were over the second and, to a lesser extent, the third point—
whether to balance and what outcome results from balancing. 
A. DECIDING TO BALANCE 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Clarence Thomas, Stephen Breyer, and Alito) concluded that “the 
search . . . falls within the category of cases this Court has analyzed by 
reference to the proposition that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment 
is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.’”40  At first glance, this 
phrasing is puzzling.  The touchstone in every case is reasonableness,41 but 
a longstanding rule renders searches without probable cause or a warrant 
automatically unreasonable unless they fall within “a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.”42  A related rule renders 
seizing a person without probable cause unreasonable—subject, again, to 
various categorical exceptions.43  Typically, the PSUWE (per-se-
unreasonable-with-exceptions) rule suffices to invalidate warrantless 
searches or detentions without probable cause without any further analysis 
of the totality of the circumstances.  King argued that this per se framework 
applied in his case and that DNA-BC fits no existing exception.44 
  
 
40 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006)). 
41 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (“It is of course true that 
in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a ‘reasonableness’ 
determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.”). 
42 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  In some twenty cases since Katz, the 
Court has reiterated the per se rule.  See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) 
(“Our cases have held that a warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls 
within a recognized exception.”).  It has been called “[t]he Supreme Court’s favorite, and 
oft-repeated, Fourth Amendment maxim.”  Craig M. Bradley, Rehnquist’s Fourth 
Amendment: Be Reasonable, 82 MISS. L.J. 259, 272 (2013).  The characterization of the 
exceptions as “few” and “well-delineated,” however, is increasingly difficult to swallow.  
See infra Part II. 
43 See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013).  Bailey delimited the 
exception that permits “officers executing a search warrant to detain the occupants of the 
premises while a proper search is conducted,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted), even though the detention is “without probable cause to arrest for a crime,” id., and 
without “particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity or poses a 
specific danger to the officers,” id. at 1037–38. 
44 Brief for Respondent at 14, King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (No. 12-207) (“This Court has only 
rarely created exceptions to the requirements of a warrant or individualized suspicion, and 
none of the existing exceptions is applicable here.”). 
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Despite academic criticism of the historical pedigree and value of 
insisting on warrants whenever possible,45 the Court accepted the premise 
that most searches require prior judicial approval or an established 
exception to the warrant requirement.46  Rather than identify an existing 
applicable exception or explicitly devise a new one, however, the Court 
tried to confine the need for a categorical exception to a subset of all 
searches, leaving the search before it to be judged under a balancing 
standard.  Thus, Justice Kennedy described the categorical-exception 
approach as a preference defeasible “[i]n some circumstances such as 
[w]hen faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations 
of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like.”47 
This elliptical description of the circumstances in which the per se rule 
gives way to direct balancing is reminiscent of the theory of “family 
resemblances” propounded by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein.48  
Wittgenstein famously argued that some terms, such as “games,” do not 
denote a set of elements with any single property in common, but that the 
items in question are linked together like “members of a family—build, 
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth—overlap 
and criss-cross.”49  Like Wittgenstein, who knew a game when he saw one 
but who deemed it unnecessary to articulate a common denominator, Justice 
Kennedy pointed to a family of cases for which direct balancing is 
appropriate without articulating any essential features of its members.50  
 
45 The now-classic challenge to the warrant preference rule comes from Akhil Reed 
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 762 (1994).  Professor 
Amar, joined by Professor Katyal, later applied the notion that there is no historical case for 
the rule to Maryland v. King.  Akhil Reed Amar & Neal K. Katyal, Why the Court Was Right 
to Allow Cheek Swabs, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2013), http://goo.gl/Y75vcL.  For descriptions of 
the foundations of the rule and some of the academic commentary on it, see infra Part II.A. 
46 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (stating that “[i]n giving content 
to the inquiry whether an intrusion is reasonable, the Court has preferred some quantum of 
individualized suspicion . . . [as] a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure,” but that 
“[i]n some circumstances, such as [w]hen faced with special law enforcement needs, 
diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that 
certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure 
reasonable,” because “[t]hose circumstances diminish the need for a warrant” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
47 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
48 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 36e (P. M. S. Hacker & 
Joachim Schulte eds., G. E. M. Anscombe et al. trans., Blackwell Publ’g 4th ed. 2009) 
(1953).  This paragraph is adapted from David H. Kaye, Response, Maryland v. King: Per 
Se Unreasonableness, the Golden Rule, and the Future of DNA Databases, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 39, 42 (2013). 
49 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 48, at 36e. 
50 The opinion suggests that the pointlessness of individualized factual determinations in 
some settings (as in deciding when to take a fingerprint or a DNA sample from an arrestee 
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Thus, although the majority was certain that the King case was part of this 
still-small family, the opinion provides little guidance on recognizing other 
cases that can be said to fall outside the PSUWE analysis. 
B. BALANCING TO DECIDE 
Having settled on the open-ended balancing standard for ascertaining 
the reasonableness of the Maryland law, the majority applied it uncritically.  
After praising “DNA technology [as] one of the most significant scientific 
advancements of our era,”51 the Court noted “the need for law enforcement 
officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and 
possessions they must take into custody.”52  To appreciate (and clarify) the 
Court’s understanding of processing and identifying arrestees, two concepts 
need to be disentangled.  The dissent’s concern for the English language 
notwithstanding,53 there is nothing linguistically sinful in using a single 
overarching term.  But the majority could have been clearer about how each 
facet of “identification” figures into the balance of interests. 
Justice Kennedy used the word “identification” to denote at least two 
uses of biometric data.  The first we can call “authentication-
identification,”54 for it refers to authenticating claims of identity (or 
establishing true identity).  Authentication is the most common application 
of biometric identifiers.  A fingerprint-activated door lock can provide a 
valid and reliable method for ensuring that only those employees who are 
authorized to enter can open the lock.55  Authentication of a person’s 
identity is, of course, a matter of real concern to police, who need to detect 
escapees, bail jumpers, and other individuals who may have disguised their 
identity.  Photographs, fingerprints, iris scans, retinal patterns, DNA 
 
who meets the statutory criteria) is an important but not a necessary trait of this family of 
cases.  See Kaye, supra note 48; see also infra Part II. 
51 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966. 
52 Id. at 1970 (emphasis added). 
53 Although Justice Scalia claimed that this use of the term “identify” offended proper 
English speech, id. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting), speaking of investigation to identify a 
culprit creates no dissonance with common parlance or statutory intent.  The point that the 
dissent was making was that laws authorizing DNA collection for “identification” have the 
primary purpose to allow DNA to be used for identifying individuals to solve crimes, rather 
than to inform decisions about pretrial custody or to create a permanent record for 
authentication—although they do or can serve these purposes as well.  But what follows 
from this historical fact about legislative motivation is far less clear than the dissent 
suggested.  See infra Part II. 
54 See Kaye, supra note 48, at 38. 
55 Of course, any pattern recognition device (and especially ones based on a single 
biometric) can be defeated by extreme measures—a point that has not been lost on writers of 
thrillers.  See generally, e.g., DAN BROWN, ANGELS AND DEMONS (2000) (imagining a 
murder to obtain a body part to defeat a retina-scanning security system). 
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polymorphisms, and still more biological traits can be used, singly or in 
conjunction, for this purpose.56  There should be little doubt that DNA has 
some value in a multimodal system for identifying arrestees with 
biometrics.57 
However, the Court did not claim that the state’s interest in 
authentication-identification of suspects is sufficient to justify DNA-BC.  
The majority also described what can be called “association-
identification.”58  The Court recognized that acquiring biometric data as a 
marker or token of individual identity can lead to other information about 
an individual.59  In particular, sometimes it can perform the criminal-
intelligence function of associating an individual with past or future crimes.  
The major crime-solving power of a DNA profile that is distinctive to an 
individual (or to a small number of people) comes from the ability to screen 
a database of unsolved crime scene samples for matches to the arrestee’s 
profile.  In addition, the record of the arrestee’s DNA profile could be 
useful in solving future crimes.  A database of DNA profiles of suspected 
terrorists is one such intelligence tool, as it can be used to inform analysts 
of these suspects’ possible involvement in bombings or other incidents in 
which DNA traces are found.60  In Justice Kennedy’s words: 
A DNA profile is useful to the police because it gives them a form of identification to 
search the records already in their valid possession.  In this respect the use of DNA for 
identification is no different than matching an arrestee’s face to a wanted poster of a 
previously unidentified suspect; or matching tattoos to known gang symbols to reveal 
a criminal affiliation; or matching the arrestee’s fingerprints to those recovered from a 
crime scene.61 
 
56 See, e.g., NANCY YUE LIU, BIO-PRIVACY: PRIVACY REGULATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE 
OF BIOMETRICS 38–44 (2012). 
57 See ARUN A. ROSS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF MULTIBIOMETRICS 22 (2006) (“[F]ingerprints 
of a small fraction of the population may be unsuitable for automatic identification because 
of genetic factors, aging, environmental or occupational reasons (e.g., manual workers may 
have a large number of cuts and bruises on their fingerprints that keep changing).”). 
58 See Kaye, supra note 48, at 44–45. 
59 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1972 (2013) (majority opinion) (“The task of 
identification necessarily entails searching public and police records based on the identifying 
information provided by the arrestee to see what is already known about him.”). 
60 See David Johnston & James Risen, U.S. Forces Join Big Assault on an Afghan 
Stronghold; One G.I. Killed; Others Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at A1 (“Law 
enforcement officials cited [Richard] Reid’s case [who was accused of trying to blow up a 
trans-Atlantic flight with explosives hidden in his shoes] as an example of how the databank 
could be useful.  Investigators discovered two human hairs embedded in a crude igniting 
device in Reid’s shoes.  The authorities said that the strands did not match Reid’s hair and 
that if a DNA database existed, analysts could search it for a match and perhaps identify an 
accomplice.”). 
61 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972. 
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Indeed, the Court insisted that with respect to trawling a database of 
crime scene records, “the only difference between DNA analysis and the 
accepted use of fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA 
provides.”62  The biometric data, whether they relate to friction-ridge skin 
or to DNA molecules, can associate individuals with a crime scene or a 
victim.63 
But how, precisely, is this intelligence function of DNA-BC 
constitutionally significant?  Justice Kennedy did not simply write that the 
contribution of DNA-BC to criminal intelligence is a legitimate and  
powerful state interest because it permits criminal prosecutions for matters 
unrelated to the original arrest.  Instead, he reasoned that the intelligence 
obtained from pretrial DNA database trawls was valuable (only?) because it 
could help in the disposition of pretrial matters with respect to the crime for 
which the defendant was arrested.64  The idea is that once officials discover 
a recorded criminal history or an apparent involvement in an unsolved 
crime—whether by fingerprints, DNA, or anything else—they can make 
better “choices about how to proceed”65 with respect to the period and 
nature of confinement.66  These choices are “critical,” and they implicate 
 
62 Id. 
63 “Trait identification” is yet another form of identification.  Some DNA sequences (and 
some fingerprint features) are correlated (to some extent) with other physical or mental traits.  
However, the majority did not use the term “identification” to refer to analyzing DNA 
sequences to infer phenotypes as opposed to ascertaining variations that differentiate an 
individual’s DNA from almost everyone else’s.  See Kaye, supra note 48, at 46. 
64 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972. 
65 Id. 
66 The opinion states that “DNA identification can provide untainted information to those 
charged with detaining suspects and detaining the property of any felon.”  Id.  By revealing 
“the type of person whom they are detaining, . . . DNA allows them to make critical choices 
about how to proceed.”  Id.  “[L]ooking forward to future stages of criminal prosecution, ‘the 
Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are 
available for trials,’” and “[a] person who is arrested for one offense but knows that he has 
yet to answer for some past crime may be more inclined to flee the instant charges, lest 
continued contact with the criminal justice system expose one or more other serious 
offenses.”  Id. at 1972–73 (citation omitted).  And beyond this possible influence on flight 
risk, “an arrestee’s past conduct is essential to an assessment of the danger he poses to the 
public, and this will inform a court’s determination whether the individual should be released 
on bail.”  Id. at 1973.  “The government’s interest in preventing crime by arrestees is both 
legitimate and compelling. . . .  This interest is not speculative. . . .  Present capabilities make 
it possible to complete a DNA identification that provides information essential to 
determining whether a detained suspect can be released pending trial.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Although the majority’s analysis pertains only to using existing DNA loci as a token of 
individual identity, one commentator believes that it means that most DNA database laws 
authorize testing DNA samples for a postulated “pedophile gene” or a hypothetical “violence 
gene”—because such postulated genes also could be useful in assessing dangerousness.  Erin 
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“legitimate,” “substantial,” and “compelling” interests involving pretrial 
detention.67  Should a defendant be released before trial?  On what 
conditions?  What plea bargain should a prosecutor be willing to consider?  
Knowing that someone picked up for one offense may be guilty of even 
more serious crimes is relevant to these pretrial matters. 
But the Court’s analysis of the extent to which DNA-BC actually 
furthers these interests is not especially probing.  After all, many arrestees 
already have criminal records.68  It is far from clear that law enforcement 
officials often will discover nonredundant bail or jail-security-related 
information from a DNA database trawl of arrestees.  This deferential mode 
of balancing, however, is nothing new.  It typifies the Court’s handling of 
special needs cases.69 
More surprising is that the majority’s list of state interests omits the 
very thing for which the DNA sample in King was used—to charge and 
convict the defendant of an unrelated crime.  The closest the Court comes to 
acknowledging the state’s dominant objective of developing criminal 
intelligence data that link arrestees to unsolved crimes is a short paragraph 
stating that “[f]inally, in the interests of justice, the identification of an 
arrestee as the perpetrator of some heinous crime may have the salutary 
 
Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 161, 180 (2013).  But it is clear that both the King majority opinion and the 
statutes adopted well before King use the term “identification” only insofar as the DNA 
authenticates an individual’s identity and produces further information through a database 
trawl.  To use these hypothetical genotypes to infer phenotypes would be to seek 
“information beyond identification,” King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979, as the Court used the phrase; 
see also Kaye, supra note 48, at 46 (discussing the opinion’s use of the phrase and the 
different meanings of “identification”); cf. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (“[E]ven if . . . it is physically possible for the government to extract genetic traits 
from the 13 loci, there is no evidence that the government could legally do so without further 
legislation, or that the government has any intention of doing so.”), vacated as moot, 659 
F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
67 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972–73. 
68 In fiscal year 2001, about 60% of federal offenders had criminal history points as 
defined in sentencing guidelines.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AND THE 
“FIRST OFFENDER” 4 (2004), available at http://goo.gl/md1WF3.  Over 40% of state felony 
defendants in large counties had at least one prior felony conviction.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, BULLETIN: FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006 (May 2010), 
http://goo.gl/NJYjmE.  Of course, the percentage with prior criminal histories would be 
lower among individuals who are merely arrested, and not later tried or convicted. 
69 See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 254, 296 (2011) (“[T]he reasonableness standard currently in use is unnecessarily 
broad and too deferential to the government.  Courts define the governmental interests 
broadly and the privacy interests narrowly, such that in practice the balancing test operates 
as a form of rational basis review under which the government presumptively wins.”). 
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effect of freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned for the same offense.”70  If 
the Court is willing to allow balancing at all, why was it not willing to place 
on the scale the state’s interest in determining whether arrestees might be 
associated with other crimes so that they can be charged with those 
crimes?71 
Having articulated at least a subset of all the state interests in DNA-
BC, the Court had to weigh them against the individual interests that 
underlie the Fourth Amendment.  First, the Court depicted the state’s 
interests as substantial.  Properly processing arrestees, it stressed, is not 
only “legitimate,”72 but also “is so important [that it] has consequences for 
every stage of the criminal process.”73  Next, the Court perceived a close 
link between these interests and “DNA identification,” which “represents an 
important advance in the techniques used by law enforcement to serve 
legitimate police concerns.”74  Indeed, the Court insisted that “DNA 
identification is an advanced technique superior to fingerprinting in many 
ways, so much so that to insist on fingerprints as the norm would make little 
sense to either the forensic expert or a layperson.”75  But the opinion 
pointed to only one superior aspect of DNA profiling for authentication: its 
power to confound the “suspect who has changed his facial features to 
evade photographic identification or even one who has undertaken the more 
arduous task of altering his fingerprints.”76  Moreover, the Court did not 
mention the inability of normal DNA profiling to distinguish between 
monozygotic twins (who represent roughly 8 individuals per 1,000).77  In 
that regard at least, fingerprints are superior.78 
On the other side of the ledger, the Court perceived no significant 
“intrusion upon the arrestee’s privacy beyond that associated with 
 
70 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974.  The opinion also states, more cryptically, that “knowing 
identity may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere.”  
Id. at 1972. 
71 One explanation might be that the majority wanted to avoid an opinion that would pave 
the way for population-wide DNA sampling.  See infra Part III.A.  Another is that the Court did 
not see fit to question the common understanding of the special needs line of cases as resting on 
an inquiry into the dominant purpose of a program alleged to advance an immediate interest 
other than the investigation and prosecution of criminals.  See infra Part II. 
72 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970. 
73 Id. at 1974. 
74 Id. at 1975. 
75 Id. at 1976. 
76 Id. 
77 See Jeroen Smits & Christiaan Monden, Twinning Across the Developing World, 6 
PLOS ONE 1, 4 (2011), http://goo.gl/GaVmHl (“[A]bout 4 in 1000 births [are] known to be 
monozygotic across the globe.”). 
78 See Anil K. Jain et al., On the Similarity of Identical Twin Fingerprints, 35 PATTERN 
RECOGNITION 2653, 2661–62 (2002). 
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fingerprinting.”79  The sampling procedure itself—the “cheek swab”—is a 
minimal [intrusion].”80  Neither do the details of King’s “13 CODIS loci . . . 
intrude on . . . privacy in a way that would make his DNA identification 
unconstitutional.”81  After all, “alleles at the CODIS loci are not at present 
revealing information beyond identification,”82 and “even if non-coding 
alleles could provide some information, they are not in fact tested for that 
end.”83  Under Maryland’s law, “[a] person may not willfully test a DNA 
sample for information that does not relate to the identification of 
individuals.”84  Thus, “[i]n light of the scientific and statutory 
safeguards, . . . the STR analysis of respondent’s DNA pursuant to CODIS 
procedures did not amount to a significant invasion of privacy”85 when 
compared to the value of DNA-BC for pretrial authentication of identity 
and informed decisionmaking about arrestees. 
In sum, the Court rejected the need to find a categorical exception to 
the warrant and probable cause requirements.  It regarded photographing, 
fingerprinting, and DNA profiling of arrestees as comparable actions amply 
justified by the utility of these biometrics in establishing the true identity of 
the individual (authentication-identification) and learning whether he might 
be responsible for other crimes (intelligence, or association-identification).  
But the analysis was oddly truncated.  The majority did not present the 
intelligence function as an important weapon in catching criminals.  It only 
relied on DNA profiling of arrestees as a source of information for pretrial 
decisions about detention for the crimes that triggered the arrests. 
C. THE DISSENT’S SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH DOCTRINE 
Like the majority, the four dissenters recognized that “free-form” 
balancing is not generally available,86 but they drew the line at a different 
 
79 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974. 
80 Id. at 1977. 
81 Id. at 1979. 
82 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1980 (citation omitted). 
85 Id.  “STR analysis” refers to ascertaining the lengths of certain DNA sequences 
composed of “short tandem repeats” of a core of several nucleotide bases.  One individual 
might have four repeats of a particular STR at a site on one chromosome (a “locus”) and six 
on the other chromosome.  A different individual could have the pair seven and eleven.  The 
list of the pairs of numbers for thirteen such loci is the CODIS profile.  See id. at 1968; see 
also JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING 154–57 (2010). 
86 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1982 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Kagan used the term “free-
form balancing” during oral argument, telling the deputy solicitor general that such 
balancing is “typically not the way we do it.”  Transcript, supra note 28, at 25.  The phrase 
does not occur in any opinion before King, according to my research, although the adjective 
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point.  Justice Scalia’s opinion asserted that “[t]he Fourth Amendment 
forbids searching a person for evidence of a crime when there is no basis for 
believing the person is guilty of the crime or is in possession of 
incriminating evidence. . . . Whenever this Court has allowed a 
suspicionless search, it has insisted upon a justifying motive apart from the 
investigation of crime.”87  The dissent then argued, caustically and 
convincingly, that the Maryland legislature was not thinking primarily (if at 
all) about things like setting bail and catching escapees who may have 
changed their other biometric features when it expanded its DNA 
databanking law to encompass arrestees.88  Those lawmakers aimed to 
enhance the efficacy of the state database in catching criminals by using it 
to associate the unidentified crime scene samples with a larger collection of 
known samples (from arrestees and from the previous base of convicted 
offenders).  And that the Constitution forbids—no matter how minor the 
intrusion on the person and on privacy—for the Fourth Amendment 
“prohibition [on suspicionless searches] is categorical and without 
exception.”89 
As a descriptive matter, the dissent’s broad claim that “a suspicionless 
search” is permissible only when there is “a justifying motive apart from 
the investigation of crime”90 is inaccurate.  Within the PSUWE framework, 
the existence of interests beyond generating information and evidence in 
criminal investigations does trigger balancing.  This balancing almost 
always enables the Court to uphold programs for special needs or 
administrative searches, such as fire and safety inspections, without 
individualized suspicion of any code violations,91 or the compulsory testing 
of all high school athletes for drug usage.92  Moreover, the Court has said 
that if the program of searches or seizures is not designed primarily to 
advance special interests, then this special needs balancing is not 
available.93 
 
“free-form” appears pejoratively in a few opinions on different topics.  See, e.g., McQuiggin 
v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1940 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing “free-form 
improvisation” in interpreting a statute); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 
2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion) (rejecting “[f]reeform notions of fundamental fairness 
divorced from traditional practice” in analyzing claims of jurisdiction). 
87 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88 See id. at 1985–86. 
89 Id. at 1980. 
90 Id. 
91 Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539–40 (1967). 
92 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995); see also infra Part 
II.A. 
93 See infra Part II.B (describing the two cases in which the Court has declined to engage 
in special needs balancing on this basis). 
2014] WHY SO CONTRIVED?  551 
That is why, to the consternation of the dissent,94 the majority did not 
present DNA-BC as falling into the special needs category.95  The majority 
ventured outside the PSUWE framework entirely—as the Court has done 
on a few previous occasions.  In Illinois v. Lidster96 and again in Samson v. 
California,97 the Court upheld suspicionless searches or seizures whose 
primary purpose—indeed, whose solitary purpose—was to develop 
investigatory leads or to find evidence of guilt.98  These cases are 
exceptions to any putative rule that suspicionless searches or seizures 
cannot have evidence production as their primary purpose. 
In Lidster, the police were looking for a driver who had struck and 
killed a seventy-year-old bicyclist.99  Police cars with flashing lights forced 
motorists to stop to be asked whether they had seen anything the previous 
weekend—when the accident occurred—that might help them identify this 
person.100  As Robert Lidster’s minivan approached the checkpoint, it 
nearly hit one of the officers.101  Lidster failed a sobriety test and was 
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol.102  The Appellate Court 
of Illinois reversed the conviction, and the Illinois Supreme Court agreed.103  
These courts reasoned that the primary purpose exception to the special 
needs exception,104 articulated in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,105 
rendered the stop unconstitutional.106 
That decision seemed correct.  In Edmond, police established a 
roadblock to check for illegal drugs with a drug-sniffing dog.107  In Lidster, 
they instituted a roadblock to discover the identity of the hit-and-run 
 
94 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1982 n.1. 
95 See id. at 1978–79 (majority opinion). 
96 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
97 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
98 See id. at 847; Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423.  Lidster is usually considered to be a special 
needs case.  See infra note 117.  On the view taken here—that searches or seizures for the 
sake of learning about crimes or generating evidence for use at a trial constitute the 
canonical law enforcement activity for which a warrant or probable cause normally is 
required—this conventional classification is incorrect. 




103 Id. at 422–23. 
104 This limitation on the special needs exception is discussed infra Part II.B. 
105 531 U.S. 32, 41–42, 48 (2000). 
106 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423. 
107 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35–36.  The Court had just held in Illinois v. Caballes that a 
dog’s promenade around a car is not a search.  543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).  What triggered the 
Fourth Amendment in the first place was only the stop of the vehicle.  See id. 
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driver.108  In both cases, it was undeniable that the sole purpose of the 
roadblock was to discover evidence of a crime.  In Lidster, however, the 
Supreme Court brushed aside the argument that the actual primary purpose 
of the program barred direct balancing.  Considering “context” and 
“circumstances”109—including the small amount of time it took for the 
stop110 and the limited nature of the questioning111—the Court held the 
roadblock constitutional via free-form balancing.112 
In choosing to balance outside the special needs category, the Lidster 
Court emphasized that the roadblock represented only a minor invasion of 
the motorists’ interests.113  Justice Scalia did not assert then, as he later did 
in King, that “[n]o matter the degree of invasiveness, suspicionless searches 
are never allowed if their principal end is ordinary crime-solving.”114  To 
the contrary, he joined the majority opinion in full.  At that time, Justice 
Scalia apparently was willing to utilize the degree of invasiveness as a 
factor in deciding whether to balance.  So too, the Court in Samson,115 again 
with Justice Scalia’s approval, upheld a police officer’s search of the 
clothing of a parolee—even though the officer had neither a special need to 
search the person nor a pretense of individualized suspicion.116 
To be sure, these cases can be distinguished from King.  In Lidster, 
“[t]he police expected the information elicited to help them apprehend, not 
the vehicle’s occupants, but other individuals.”117  In contrast, DNA-BC 
 
108 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422.  Asking questions or distributing a flyer, as occurred in 
Lidster, is not a search.  Id. at 428; see also id. at 425 (“[T]he law ordinarily permits police 
to seek the voluntary cooperation of members of the public in the investigation of a crime.”); 
id. at 426 (“[I]t would seem anomalous were the law (1) ordinarily to allow police freely to 
seek the voluntary cooperation of pedestrians but (2) ordinarily to forbid police to seek 
similar voluntary cooperation from motorists.”).  As in Edmond, the only Fourth 
Amendment interest at stake in Lidster was freedom of movement.  See id. at 427–28. 
109 Id. at 424–26. 
110 Id. at 426 (“After all, as we have said, the motorist stop will likely be brief.  Any 
accompanying traffic delay should prove no more onerous than many that typically 
accompany normal traffic congestion.”). 
111 Id. at 425 (“The police are not likely to ask questions designed to elicit self-
incriminating information.”). 
112 Id. at 428. 
113 Id. at 424 (“Neither do we believe, Edmond aside, that the Fourth Amendment would 
have us apply an Edmond-type rule of automatic unconstitutionality to brief, information-
seeking highway stops of the kind now before us.”). 
114 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1982 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
115 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
116 Id. at 857.  
117 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423.  This may be why Lidster is regarded conventionally as a 
special needs case.  See, e.g., United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(“Applying the special needs doctrine, the Lidster Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
checkpoint whose primary purpose was to gather information from motorists who might 
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seeks information that could incriminate many of the arrestees even if, as in 
Lidster, that is not the expectation in every, or even the majority, of the 
cases.  As for Samson, one can limit its reach by insisting that parolees 
simply forfeit their Fourth Amendment rights.118  But that it is not how 
Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in Samson presents the result,119 and 
the King dissent’s theory of a “prohibition that is categorical and without 
exception” and that “lies at the very heart of the Fourth Amendment”120 is 
not an accurate statement of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
When considering routine, suspicionless DNA collection for database 
trawls, especially but not exclusively after conviction, a great many judges 
in state and federal courts alike were convinced that a categorical rule like 
the dissent’s rule was not a barrier to such DNA collection.121 
The dissent’s theory certainly would have simplified matters, but the 
law before, and now after, King is not so simple.  Figure 1 shows the more 
complex current state of affairs.122  It supplies a more complete picture of 
 
have witnessed a fatal hit-and-run accident the week before.”); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond 
Law Enforcement: Camreta v. Greene, Child Protection Investigations, and the Need to 
Reform the Fourth Amendment Special Needs Doctrine, 87 TUL. L. REV. 353, 373 (2012) 
(referring to Lidster as “an earlier special needs case”); Kit Kinports, Camreta and al-Kidd: 
The Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment, and Witnesses, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
283, 306 (2012) (analyzing the reach of “the special need recognized” in Lidster).  The 
perception is that questioning members of the public to gather information on crimes in 
which they were not known to be involved is a special need.  On this understanding, 
however, it is arguable, as the Second Circuit determined in Amerson, 483 F.3d at 82–83, 
and Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668–69 (2d Cir. 2005), that creating a DNA database 
is also a special need.  The point of a DNA database system, like the dragnet questioning of 
the many motorists in Lidster, is to yield information about crimes when those who are 
subject to the program are not known to be associated with the crimes. 
118 During the oral argument in King, Justice Sotomayor stated “[a]s I read Samson, it 
was the special relationship between the parolee or the probationary person, that line of 
cases, and the assumption being that they’re out in the world, I think, by the largesse of the 
State,” and that therefore “a State has a right to search their home, just as it would their cell, 
essentially.”  Transcript, supra note 28, at 11. 
119 The opinion pursued a more extended balancing.  It did not stop with the observation 
that “[e]xamining the totality of the circumstances pertaining to petitioner’s status as a 
parolee . . . including [but not limited to] the plain terms of the parole search condition, we 
conclude that petitioner did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize 
as legitimate.”  Samson, 547 U.S. at 852.  It also enumerated “substantial” state interests.  Id. 
at 853–55. 
120 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
121 See, e.g., Kaye, “Considered Analysis,” supra note 17, at 114–17 (criticizing the 
readiness of three such courts to balance rather than to apply a categorical rule).  See 
generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of State 
DNA Database Statutes, 76 A.L.R. 5th 239 (2005). 
122 The final category applies not to the decision to search or seize, but to the manner in 
which a search or seizure is implemented.  The category includes, for instance, ad hoc 
balancing to avoid “excessive force” in the execution of an arrest or search warrant, e.g., Los 
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when the Court uses balancing to establish Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness.123  To support Justice Scalia’s theory for suspicionless 
searches, we would have to eliminate parts of the direct-balancing branch of 
the case law.  This pruning might be desirable, but the dissent offered no 
normatively grounded defense of its no-suspicionless-search rule.124 
  
 
Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007) (“In executing a search warrant 
officers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and ensure their own safety . . . 
[but] unreasonable actions include the use of excessive force[.]”), and “unreasonably 
burdensome” administrative demands for documents, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 
541, 544 (1967) ( “[T]he Fourth Amendment requires that the [agency] subpoena . . . not be 
unreasonably burdensome.”). 
123 For discussion of specific cases in which the Court has balanced, see generally David 
H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric Databases, 15 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095 (2013) [hereinafter Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory]; Kaye, 
“Considered Analysis,” supra note 17. 
124 Cf. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1118 (maintaining that 
Samson and Knights are anomalous departures from the PSUWE framework). 
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Figure 1 
Situations Where Balancing Determines 
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness 






a See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
b See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (“When faced with 
such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests 
to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular 
context.”). 
c See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 
112, 121–22 (2001). 
d See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 421 (2004). 
e See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965–66 (2013). 
f See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). 
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Because the dissent dismissed the majority’s “free-form 
reasonableness” analysis as impermissible, it did not directly question the 
details of that balancing or argue that, in a sensible and complete balancing 
of the relevant state and individual interests, the latter should prevail.  In 
fact, the dissent objected to the balancing precisely because it thought that 
such balancing must justify far more than the collection of DNA from 
arrestees.125 
At the same time, the dissent did maintain that arrestee databasing, as 
actually practiced in Maryland and elsewhere, was inconsistent with the 
purposes the majority ascribed to DNA-BC.  The state did not collect the 
sample, analyze it, and upload the profile all as part of the booking 
process.126  Days, weeks, and months went by before the state completed 
this process.  King’s profile was not checked against the existing offender 
and arrestee indices to see whether he was who he claimed to be.  For the 
dissent, the fact that “DNA . . . was [not] used for identification [in the 
sense of authentication] here”127 was dispositive.  The dissent doubted that 
“the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so 
eager to open their mouths for royal inspection,”128 and that was that. 
II. DOCTRINAL ALTERNATIVES: A CLOSER LOOK AT PSUWE AND THE 
DEMISE OF THE WARRANT-PREFERENCE RULE 
Although the King Court rejected the need to find a categorical 
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements for searches, this 
Article has shown that doing so did not breach a previously impermeable 
barrier to balancing outside of the PSUWE framework.  But the very 
permeability of the barrier is worrisome.  The family resemblance theory of 
when to balance is intrinsically vague,129 and excluding the value of DNA 
databases for criminal investigations in the subsequent balancing strains 
credulity because it is disconnected from the dominant legislative purpose 
and the use to which King’s profile was put.  This Part therefore outlines 
less contrived defenses of DNA-BC under the Fourth Amendment.  In 
addition, it offers a conceptualization of the case law that is less convoluted 
than the Court’s current off-again, on-again PSUWE framework. 
A court determined to uphold DNA sampling before conviction could 
have dealt with the per se rule in four ways.  First, it could have replaced 
the PSUWE framework with universal free-form balancing—a universe in 
 
125 See infra Part III. 
126 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1983–84 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
127 Id. at 1988–89. 
128 Id. at 1989. 
129 See supra Part I.A. 
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which courts always look at all relevant factors and circumstances bearing 
on the reasonableness of a search or seizure without worrying about 
categorical rules.130  Second, the Court could have found a niche for DNA-
BC programs, such as Maryland’s, within the special needs exception.  
Third, the Court could have explicitly created a new, sui generis exception 
for collecting and using DNA samples (and other biometric data) from 
arrestees.  Finally, considering the differences between biometric-data 
acquisition and use and traditional searches, it could have explicitly 
recognized a broader categorical exception for acquiring and using certain 
types of biometric data, including DNA identification profiles, in a program 
with sufficient privacy safeguards.  Instead of adopting any of these 
approaches, the Court implicitly, and awkwardly, created a new special-
needs-type exception for DNA-BC programs.  Let us examine just what the 
King Court did—and what it might have done—more carefully. 
A. DISCARDING THE PER SE RULE 
In theory, the Court could have adopted a new regime in which every 
case involves a direct inquiry into the reasonableness of the search or 
seizure under all the case-specific circumstances.  This “no lines” regime, 
as it has been called,131 would resemble that of tort cases in which juries are 
asked to use their best judgment to decide whether the defendant’s conduct 
was unreasonable.132  If this is what “free-form balancing” means, then the 
King Court did not embrace it.  Rather, King’s balancing incorporated only 
the state’s special (non-crime-solving) interests, and the Court did not 
question the need for categorical exceptions in most cases.  The opinions 
thus do little to resolve two overlapping debates about the meaning of 
reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment and the need for the PSUWE 
framework.  This Section explains the two intersecting debates and their 
relationship to the decision to balance in King. 
 
130 See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1468, 1471 (1985). 
131 See id. 
132 See id.  Many other analogies are apt.  See Lee, supra note 35, at 1133–34 
(analogizing to “the requirement in criminal law that a person claiming self-defense must 
have reasonably believed that the force used was necessary” to prevent an attack).  For 
another example, in probable cause inquiries, judges must decide when “there is a reasonable 
ground for belief of guilt.”  Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)); see also Kit Kinports, Diminishing Probable 
Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 649, 649–50 (2009) (analyzing the 
differences between traditional probable cause and the less demanding showing of 
reasonable suspicion required for investigatory stops and frisks). 
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1. Reasonabilists and Warrantists 
Some Justices have spoken of Fourth Amendment reasonableness as a 
no-lines regime,133 and commentators have disagreed on the proper reading 
of the relevant text and history of the Amendment.  The Amendment 
protects personal security134 with two parallel clauses: 
[1] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and [2] no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.135 
The first clause bars unreasonable searches and seizures; the second 
requires that warrants be based on probable cause.  But the Amendment is 
silent on how the two clauses interact,136 the historical record is “foggy,”137 
 
133 As Justice Frank Murphy framed this view in United States v. Rabinowitz, “[t]he 
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the 
search was reasonable.  That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances—the 
total atmosphere of the case.”  339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).  For more recent incarnations of the 
case-specific view of reasonableness, see Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); 
Kaye, “Considered Analysis,” supra note 17, at 115–17 (discussing three opinions by Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist). 
134 See generally Jack Wade Nowlin, The Warren Court’s House Built on Sand: From 
Security in Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects to Mere Reasonableness in Fourth 
Amendment Doctrine, 81 MISS. L.J. 1017, 1018 (2012) (arguing that more robust protection 
would flow “from a traditional concern with the security of persons, houses, papers, and 
effects” rather than the Warren Court’s “innovative analysis centered on the prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures”); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
101, 104 (2008) (arguing that the core value of the Fourth Amendment is the interest in 
personal security rather than the privacy of information); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive 
Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 394, 446 (1995) (maintaining that the 
Fourth Amendment is meant to limit “coercion and violence”).  But see STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 130 (2012) (asserting that the core of the Fourth Amendment is “the right to 
control knowledge about our personal lives, the right to decide how much information gets 
revealed to whom and for which purposes”); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE 
NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 23–26 (2007) (contending 
that privacy is a central Fourth Amendment value). 
135 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
136 Competing theories are described in, for example, Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ 
Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1061 (2011) 
(rejecting the notion that the Amendment was “designed solely to ban general warrants”); 
Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container 
Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 
1409–14 (2010) (explaining that the warrant preference view of the Fourth Amendment 
views the two clauses “as interconnected, one giving meaning to the other”).  
137 TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (1969); see 
also Maclin & Mirabella, supra note 32, at 1063, 1064–67 (describing “areas of 
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and the scholarly literature divided.138  Reasonabilists insist that the two 
clauses are separate and distinct.  All the Amendment seems to require is 
that a search be reasonable and that warrants, when they are sought, be 
based on probable cause.139  Consequently, Reasonabilists could accept the 
no-lines model as consistent with the framing of the Amendment. 
Warrantists read the clauses together so that warrantless searches are 
generally unreasonable.140  They maintain that in every case in which it is 
feasible to obtain a warrant based on probable cause, it is necessary to do 
so.141  Therefore, Warrantists would reject a standard that treats warrantless 
searches as reasonable when no good reason for dispensing with the warrant 
is apparent.142 
2. Balancers and Categorizers 
The now-dominant Reasonabilist interpretation of the text of the 
Fourth Amendment and the statements of various Justices that “the ultimate 
 
disagreement” in the leading historical analysts’ understandings of the Framers’ views 
regarding reasonableness and warrantless searches). 
138 See Clancy, supra note 136, at 982–89; Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original 
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 552–53 (1999) (challenging the historical 
foundations of both of “the two currently competing constructions of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness: the more conventional warrant-preference construction, which treats the 
warrant process as the central protection called for by the Amendment, and the generalized-
reasonableness construction, which rejects the need for, or value of, warrants”); Tracey 
Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 
925, 928–29 (1997) (arguing that history supports the “warrant preference rule”); David E. 
Steinberg, An Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment History, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 227, 267 (2005) (“The historical record actually supports a third 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, different from both the warrant preference rule and 
Professor Amar’s reasonableness approach.  Specifically, the framers enacted the 
amendment solely to regulate house searches.”). 
139 The leading modern expositor of this position is Professor Akhil Amar.  See AKHIL 
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 64–77 (1998); Amar, 
supra note 45, at 759; Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1998) [hereinafter Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First 
Principles]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1178–81 (1991). 
140 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 138, at 559 (“For most of [the twentieth] century, the 
Supreme Court has endorsed what is now called the ‘warrant-preference’ construction of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, in which the use of a valid warrant . . . is the salient 
factor in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”). 
141 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (“[P]olice must, whenever practicable, 
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.”). 
142 This would be the position of a Total Warrantist.  See, e.g., McCommon v. 
Mississippi, 474 U.S. 984, 986 n.* (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of petition 
for writ of certiorari) (referring in a footnote to “[his] view that automobile searches 
presenting no exigent circumstances should be fully subject to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement”). 
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touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”143 are not 
necessarily equivalent to advocacy of universal, ad hoc balancing.144  
Overlapping the Reasonabilist–Warrantist debate—and easily confused 
with the division between the two groups—is the pervasive tension between 
Balancers and Categorizers.145  Balancers prefer flexible standards, like 
reasonableness or utility.  Categorizers seek to constrain discretion with 
more rigid rules crafted to promote the ultimate goals.  Inevitably, rules are 
too broad or too narrow, but on average, they may perform better than 
giving fallible judges license to balance on ad hoc bases.  Consequently, 
even a Reasonabilist construction of the Fourth Amendment can produce a 
system in which warrants are required unless a categorical exception 
provides otherwise.  The situation is similar to the defense of moral rules by 
utilitarians.  The “rule utilitarian” believes that moral questions are best 
resolved by a system of rules that are calculated to maximize utility and that 
do not permit every moral agent to decide which acts are, all things 
considered, utility-maximizing.146  Likewise, a Fourth Amendment 
 
143 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 
U.S. 398, 403 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Professor Murphy presents the 
“touchstone” sentence found in Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013), as a 
“remarkable” signal of “the demise of the warrant standard.”  Murphy, supra note 66, at 184.  
Yet, the “touchstone” statement appears in opinions extending back to Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977).  Mimms used the statement to apply a modified 
version of the stop-and-frisk exception inaugurated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to an 
aspect of an automobile stop.  See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109.  That is, Mimms held it was 
reasonable, as a safety precaution, for police to order a person driving with an expired 
license plate and lawfully stopped for a traffic summons to get out of the automobile, id. at 
111–12, even though “the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the particular 
driver at the time of the stop,” id. at 109.  Echoing Terry, the Court perceived that the 
intrusion on “the driver’s personal liberty” (in having to stand outside the vehicle for a short 
time) paled in comparison to the interest of the police in avoiding “unnecessary risks in the 
performance of their duties.”  Id. at 110–11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
144 For commentary that may conflate the issue of across-the-board balancing with the 
separate-clauses construction of the Fourth Amendment, see Kaye, A Fourth Amendment 
Theory, supra note 123, at 1101–04; Murphy, supra note 66, at 183–87. 
145 On balancing and classifying in other fields of law, see, for example, Daniel A. 
Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 50 
(2007); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE 
L.J. 877, 912–16 (1963); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 577, 590 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57–95 (1992). 
146 The “act utilitarian” judges the morality of an action by ascertaining its utility, all 
things considered.  The “rule utilitarian” relies on a set of rules thought to approximate the 
results of ad hoc judgments.  The rule utilitarian can invoke the principle of utility to create a 
generic exception to a rule, but regardless of his intuition about what a direct assessment of 
utility would show in the particular case, he may not depart from the applicable rule on an ad 
hoc basis.  See Brad Hooker, Rule Consequentialism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), http://goo.gl/yUOAzV. 
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Reasonabilist can favor a rule that (1) allows warrantless searches of certain 
types and (2) forbids warrantless searches that do not fall into these 
categories. 
3. The Modern PSUWE Framework 
Before King, Reasonabilists and Warrantists both spoke of a per se 
rule with exceptions, but they battled on two fronts.  One front was whether 
to construe the varied exceptions to the warrant requirement expansively to 
permit the police to search without a warrant, without probable cause, or 
even without particularized suspicion in certain types of cases.  The 
Reasonabilists won the battle.  They achieved victory by expanding the 
categorical exceptions.  They built the exceptions into walls that remained 
unbreachable, even when a warrant easily could have been obtained in the 
particular case.147 
The overbroad categorical exceptions have been the target of much 
criticism, but the disagreements over where to place the boundaries of the 
exceptions have not replaced the system of categorical exceptions with a 
negligence-law-like universe of ad hoc balancing.  Both before and after 
King, a court must ask whether a search is of the type that falls under a 
categorical exception.148  If it does, the search is deemed reasonable, 
whether or not police could have obtained a warrant in the particular 
 
147 See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1985) (applying the moving-vehicle 
exception devised in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159 (1925), to a motor home 
parked for an extended period near a courthouse).  As Justice Sotomayor explained in 
Missouri v. McNeely, “[w]e have recognized a limited class of traditional exceptions to the 
warrant requirement that apply categorically and thus do not require an assessment of 
whether the policy justifications underlying the exception, which may include exigency-
based considerations, are implicated in a particular case.”  133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 n.3 (2013) 
(citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569–70 (1991) (automobile exception); United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224–35 (1973) (searches incident to arrest)).  In contrast, 
the McNeely Court treated “the general exigency exception, which asks whether an 
emergency existed that justified a warrantless search” as one that “naturally calls for a case-
specific inquiry.”  Id.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito advanced the 
following understanding of the exigent circumstances exception in drunk driving cases: 
“[T]here may be time to secure a warrant before blood can be drawn.  If there is, an officer 
must seek a warrant.  If an officer could reasonably conclude that there is not, the exigent 
circumstances exception applies . . . and the blood may be drawn without a warrant.”  Id. at 
1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  This proposed rule for “the 
general exigency exception” is the one that a Total Warrantist would apply to all searches. 
148 As indicated in Figure 1, the manner in which a search or seizure is conducted is 
subject to case-specific balancing.  Application of the exigent circumstances exception does 
not entail ad hoc balancing, but under McNeely, it is a case-specific rather than a categorical 
exception.  See discussion supra note 147. 
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case.149  To this extent, the reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment 
has prevailed over an “almost universal warrant requirement.”150 
The other front in the Warrantist–Reasonabilist struggle pertains to 
situations in which the government ventures outside the ramparts of the 
categorical exceptions.  Are these searches or seizures always 
unreasonable?151  Or are there cases in which it is appropriate to balance to 
find reasonableness without a simple exception?  For traditional evidence- 
or contraband-related searches or seizures, the answer remains in the 
affirmative—an established exception is required or a new one must be 
recognized.152  Although at oral argument Justice Kennedy toyed with the 
thought that DNA collection on arrest was a search incident to arrest,153 he 
 
149 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 35, at 1146 (“If the government engages in a warrantless 
search and that search satisfies the requirements of a well-delineated exception to the 
warrant requirement, it too will be presumed reasonable.”). 
150 Bradley, supra note 130, at 1494.  See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, 
Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609 (2012) (urging adoption of an 
overarching warrant requirement); William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of 
the “Per Se” Rule: Justice Stewart’s Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant 
Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013 (1994) (observing that the Court’s use of balancing in 
cases since Justice Stewart’s departure has undermined the per se rule). 
151 Qualifiers like “presumptively,” “generally,” and “ordinarily” commonly modify the 
Court’s statements of the per se rule, but these terms merely may refer to the possibility of an 
exception.  For example, in Groh v. Ramirez, the Court wrote that “our cases have firmly 
established the ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside 
a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”  540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) 
(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).  Payton v. New York, however, 
includes a footnote explaining “presumptively unreasonable” as follows: “a search or seizure 
carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the 
police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the 
presence of ‘exigent circumstances.’”  445 U.S. at 586 n.25 (quoting Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971)). 
152 Consistent with the function of the warrant and probable cause requirements, 
balancing is always available to recognize a new exception or refine the boundaries of an 
already established one.  In developing these standard exceptions, relevant considerations 
include the severity of the intrusion on the person or property, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (dismissing as “de minimis” a driver’s interest in 
remaining inside a validly stopped car); the practicality of seeking a warrant, see, e.g., 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (“Our decisions have recognized that a 
warrantless entry by criminal law enforcement officials may be legal when there is 
compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.”); and the value of 
screening for probable cause (or a lesser degree of individualized suspicion) by a magistrate; 
see, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989) (finding no 
need “to interpose a neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement officer” 
when there are “no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.”). 
153 Transcript, supra note 28, at 26 (asking the deputy solicitor general why this is not a 
search incident to arrest “just like taking the pockets out and . . . seeing what’s in the 
person’s overcoat and so forth”).  Justice Scalia, on the other hand, may have described the 
exception too narrowly.  Id. at 27 (suggesting that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine only 
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wisely veered away from that idea in the opinion.154  DNA sampling is not 
required to protect the arresting officer or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence.155 
Nevertheless, in the last half century, the Court has upheld as 
reasonable one type of search after another, the abject absence of probable 
cause or a warrant notwithstanding.156  Drug tests in schools157 and in the 
workplace,158 roadblocks to get drunk drivers off the roads,159 inspections of 
fire-damaged premises,160 and periodic searches of jail cells,161 for example, 
do not require probable cause and a warrant.  The common theme of these 
cases is that the government’s interests go beyond the production of 
evidence for use in a criminal investigation or prosecution.  In ordinary 
cases, in which the only point of the search is to generate such evidence or 
to seize contraband or stolen items, a warrant (or, conceivably, a brand-new 
exception) is still required.  As such, the PSUWE framework has not been 
replaced with a no-lines standard.  But in those cases in which an additional 
interest—including law enforcement interests relating to confining 
prisoners—is present, the Court asks whether the state’s interests outweigh 
the invasion of the individual interest in being free from arbitrary or 
oppressive searches.162 
Although the administrative and special needs searches often are 
presented as if they comprise a single exception, they represent a category 
of exceptions rather than a single categorical exception.  The presence of an 
administrative system or a special need is nothing more than a potential 
reason to recognize new, discrete exceptions.  Weighty interests beyond or 
 
allows police to search for weapons and “material that relates to the crime for which the 
person has been arrested”).  The deputy solicitor general corrected both Justices.  Id. at 26–
27 (calling Justice Scalia’s construction “inaccurate” because the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception allows a “full search of the person for any destructible evidence,” and “[t]he crime 
of arrest limitation . . . [only] relates to cars”). 
154 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013).  The dissent easily showed that the 
practice does not fit into the exception established for searches incident arrest.  See id. at 
1982 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
155 These two concerns define the scope of the search incident to arrest exception. 
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
156 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011) (enumerating four 
such situations).  
157 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995). 
158 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989). 
159 Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
160 Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294 (1984) (plurality opinion); cf. Camara v. 
Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535–38 (1967) (inspections for compliance with a housing code 
pursuant to area-wide warrants did not require individualized suspicion). 
161 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979). 
162 See Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1108. 
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other than the investigation or prosecution of crimes provide a license to 
create additional categorical exceptions—by balancing.  For example, an 
exception for vehicle checkpoints near the border flows from a special 
need—controlling entry to the country.163  So does an exception for random 
searches of a prisoner’s cell—to remove contraband that poses threats to 
prison discipline or security.164  These specific exceptions are two of the 
many distinct special needs exceptions that categorically justify causeless, 
warrantless searches.165 
Seen in this light, the PSUWE framework requires a court to look 
through more than twenty discrete exceptions of varying degrees of 
precision, some for criminal law enforcement evidence searches and others 
for administrative or special needs searches.166   If none of these exceptions 
apply, the search is unreasonable unless it differs from traditional searches 
for contraband or evidence of a crime in a way that justifies a new 
exception. 
King is broadly consistent with this PSUWE framework.  It does not 
liberate courts to weigh interests ab initio in light of the totality of the 
circumstances in every case.167  Had the majority wished to discard the 
PSUWE framework in this wholesale manner, it would not have needed to 
cobble together a set of purely detention-related state interests.  Had the 
Court wished to dispose of the per se rule in toto, it could have relied on the 
unusual power of DNA databases to produce leads with which to apprehend 
wrongdoers and evidence with which to convict them.  The Court did 
neither of these things.  Instead, it left the PSUWE framework intact, at 
least with respect to the existence of categorical exceptions that avoid the 
 
163 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561–62 (1976); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). 
164 See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1516 (2012). 
165 The cases establish categorical exceptions when they uphold whole types of searches 
or seizures without regard to the specific facts of each case falling under the program in 
question.  Thus, certain kinds of roadblocks, drug tests of employees, searches of students’ 
property, inspections of jail cells, DNA-BC, and much more are permissible without a 
warrant and probable cause when the program authorizing this official conduct meets certain 
criteria for each exception. 
166 See Bradley, supra note 132, at 1473–74 (cataloging the exceptions as of 1985). 
167 King does not empower courts to consider, for example, the nature of the specific 
crime they are seeking to solve in deciding whether a particular warrantless search of a 
container is constitutional.  Although it surely is more important to solve a robbery-murder 
case by searching a suspect for the wallet that the killer stole than to ascertain a joyrider’s 
identity by searching the same suspect for the key to the car, the gravity of the incident 
motivating the search is not part of the inquiry into the reasonableness of the search.  Instead 
of adopting this kind of ad hoc balancing for all cases, the Court employed the programmatic 
balancing used in special interest cases for the Maryland practice of preconviction DNA 
collection and analysis.  See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969–70 (2013). 
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need for a particularized showing that a warrant was not feasible.  And, it 
tried to confine its strategy of sidestepping the PSUWE framework as 
applied to searches or searches outside of the usual safe harbors to cases 
bearing some family resemblance to some special needs cases. 
The opinion suggests that the most recognizable family trait is that 
“the search involves no discretion that could properly be limited by the 
‘interpo[lation of] a neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law 
enforcement officer.’”168  As in the case of a policy that always requires 
inventory searches of arrestees, a magistrate has nothing to decide with 
regard to mandatory DNA sampling.  This rationale for dispensing with 
warrants applies in various special needs cases, like the inventory search 
(even though it is preceded by a discretionary decision to make an arrest).169  
It also applies to Lidster, in which the roadblock for solving the hit-and-run 
case applied to all drivers,170 rendering pointless a magistrate’s judgment of 
whether any given driver had done anything wrong or had pertinent 
knowledge.  But the other two direct-balancing cases, Samson and Knights, 
are members of the family that do not share this feature,171 leaving the 
boundaries of the non-PSUWE cases obscure. 
Although claims that King has abolished the PSUWE framework are 
premature, the Court’s continued willingness to step outside the PSUWE 
framework on rare occasions is problematic.  It complicates what should be 
a more straightforward analytical framework, and excessive use of the 
escape mechanism of direct balancing in an ill-defined set of non-special-
needs cases would undermine the PSUWE framework. 
Consequently, there are good reasons to consider alternatives that are 
less anomalous than the King Court’s resort to direct balancing in lieu of 
explicitly creating a new categorical exception.  The next Section shows 
how the Court could have created the same sui generis exception for DNA-
BC without stepping outside the special needs category.  Then, the final 
Section in this Part indicates how it could have embraced a still broader 
categorical exception. 
 
168 Id. at 1969 (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 
(1989)).  When this condition exists, “[t]he need for a warrant is perhaps least.”  Id. 
169 See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) (stating that “standardized 
inventory procedures are appropriate”). 
170 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004). 
171 Both cases resulted from an isolated search after an individual aroused a police 
officer’s suspicion.  Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846–47 (2006); United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 115 (2001). 
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B. SPECIAL NEEDS BALANCING 
Authentication-identification is a special need.  It permits jailers, 
judges, and prosecutors to know whether an arrestee has a criminal 
record—not because the record is evidence of guilt in the current case—but 
because it is relevant to administrative and judicial decisions about the need 
for and nature of pretrial confinement.  This is the purpose given such great 
weight by the King majority.172  Having a permanent biometric record 
serves sundry other interests as well.173 
Yet, both Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion stated that King did not fall into the special needs 
category.  Two relatively recent cases created a stumbling block.  In these 
cases, the Court declared the exception inapplicable if criminal evidence 
collection was the primary purpose of the program of searches.  One case, 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,174 which we encountered in Part I.C, 
involved road blocks and dogs trained to detect drugs.  The other, Ferguson 
v. City of Charleston,175 was a program developed by law enforcement 
authorities at the suggestion of a hospital to test pregnant women’s urine for 
drug metabolites and to use the criminal law to coerce women into drug 
counseling.176  However, these cases are distinguishable from King in that 
the “primary purpose” of ordinary law enforcement—gathering evidence 
suitable for prosecutions—was their only purpose.  The Court has never 
decided whether the same result should apply when the program truly 
serves multiple purposes.177 
If special needs balancing is available for single purpose searches, it 
also should be available for multipurpose ones.  Consider two search 
programs that differ only in this regard: Program 1 serves special interests 
without advancing the ordinary law enforcement interest of producing 
evidence for criminal investigations and prosecutions; Program 2 serves 
special interests plus law enforcement interests.  Ceteris paribus, Program 2 
must be the more reasonable.  The government interests are stronger, and 
the premise that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment already struck the 
balance in favor of warrants and probable cause applies only when the 
 
172 See supra Part I.B. 
173 A traditional justification for acquiring biometric data on arrestees was to enforce 
laws seeking to prevent escape.  Kaye, supra note 39, at 486.  Additional uses for biometric 
data on arrestees can be found in Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 
1127, 1129. 
174 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
175 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
176 Id. at 80, 83. 
177 See Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1125. 
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government has no special interests that merit consideration.178  Yet, the 
primary purpose restriction on special needs balancing prevents the Court 
from upholding Program 2 (when evidence production is the primary 
purpose) but allows it to uphold Program 1 (because the added benefit to 
law enforcement was not the primary purpose of the legislature in adopting 
the program). 
All the Justices in King, however, took the “primary purpose” 
limitation on special needs balancing as sacrosanct and applicable to 
multipurpose programs.  The majority wrote that “[t]he special needs cases, 
though in full accord with the result reached here, do not have a direct 
bearing on the issues presented in this case . . . .”179  These Justices felt free 
to balance to determine whether the Maryland law was reasonable because 
cases within the special needs rubric had engaged in such balancing, as had 
a few (most notably Samson) that did not qualify as special needs cases.  
The dissent found the reference to the special needs cases “perplexing,” if 
not disingenuous.180  This opinion relentlessly hammered away at the fact 
that the primary purpose of the Maryland statute was to generate evidence 
with which to apprehend and convict more criminals. 
The King Court’s direct balancing sidesteps the primary purpose 
limitation on creating a new exception to accommodate special interests.  
But the resulting system, in which the Court takes pains to assure itself of a 
primary purpose, and then dispenses with the need for such a finding when 
it does not find one, is complicated and obscure.  The Court could have 
simply narrowed the primary purpose limitation for special needs balancing 
to a sole purpose limitation.181  DNA-BC serves multiple purposes, and 
dropping the assumed primary purpose limitation on balancing in 
multipurpose search programs therefore would have enabled the Court to 
balance to determine whether DNA-BC belongs in the category of 
warrantless searches made permissible by special interests. 
To be sure, even this simplified structure would be far from perfect.  
What kind of a “rule” has more than twenty not-always-well-defined 
exceptions?182  My claim, however, is not that today’s PSUWE rule is 
 
178 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 352 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); 
Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1111–13. 
179 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013). 
180 Id. at 1982 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
181 See supra notes 177–78  and accompanying text. 
182 The rule against hearsay comes to mind.  It even includes a perplexing residual 
exception, just in case none of the more specific exceptions applies to highly reliable 
hearsay.  FED. R. EVID. 807.  Is it surprising that calls for hearsay reform have been legion?  
For examples of such reform proposals, see generally Roger C. Park, A Subject Matter 
Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51 (1987); Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional 
Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 
568 DAVID H. KAYE [Vol. 104 
trouble-free, but only that the King Court would have done better to treat 
DNA-BC as a multipurpose program eligible for special needs balancing 
rather than presenting it as a cousin of the special needs cases residing 
outside the realm of special needs balancing.  Along with that shift in 
perspective, the majority could have undertaken a less contrived balancing 
to ascertain whether DNA-BC programs—as one facet of a multimodal, 
multipurpose biometric identification system for custodial arrestees—
should emerge as a new exception.  Given the majority’s understanding of 
the value of DNA-BC in solving and deterring crime, the special interests it 
advances in the case of individuals who are under custodial arrest, and its 
limited intrusiveness as compared to traditional, full-blown searches of 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, the majority could have more 
convincingly crafted a new special needs exception rather than creating the 
same narrow exception implicitly via direct balancing.183 
C. A BROADER BIOMETRIC EXCEPTION 
The Court also might have left the broad contours of the PSUWE 
framework unchanged by creating a broader categorical exception for the 
acquisition and use of certain biometric data for authentication- and 
association-identification.184  The established exceptions to per se 
 
MINN. L. REV. 623 (1992); J.R. Spencer, Hearsay Reform: The Train Hits the Buffers at 
Strasbourg, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 258 (2009).  But the existence of a large number of 
exceptions poses no great problem for hearsay, for most are obviously inapplicable in a 
particular case.  Only those exceptions whose contents are difficult to discern render a rule 
hard to administer.  Similarly, once an exception for a special needs program is recognized, 
it can be applied easily if its boundaries are reasonably clear.  Thus, the presence of more 
than twenty exceptions to the warrant requirement is not itself a strong reason to condemn 
the extended per se framework.  Problems arise, however, from the vagueness in the 
standards for recognizing new exceptions and from the indeterminacy or overbreadth in the 
boundaries of the existing ones.  See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459, 460 n.4 
(1981) (responding to “[t]he difficulty courts have had” defining “the proper scope of a 
search of the interior of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants” 
by adopting an overbroad rule allowing full searches of the passenger compartment, 
including “closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located 
anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and 
the like”), limited by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). 
183 Just how narrow the King exception is can be disputed.  That is the subject of Part III 
infra. 
184 See Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1139 (defending the view 
that “[i]t should be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to acquire, analyze, store, and 
trawl biometric data without a warrant and without individualized suspicion when five 
conditions hold: (1) the person legitimately is detained (or the data are acquired without 
confining the individual); (2) the process of collecting the data is not physically or mentally 
invasive; (3) collection proceeds according to rules that prevent arbitrary selection of 
individuals; (4) the biometric data are used only to establish or authenticate the true identity 
of a given individual or to link individuals to crime scenes; and (5) the authentication or 
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unreasonableness for searches for criminal evidence or contraband are 
based on pragmatic considerations about the practicality of, and need for, a 
magistrate’s review as well as the nature of the infringement on individual 
interests, such as freedom of movement and the security of one’s person 
and possessions.  As with detaining a resident during a search with a 
warrant185 or briefly stopping, questioning, and patting down an individual 
who might be armed and about to commit a robbery,186 the acquisition of 
biometric data is a lesser intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests than are 
custodial arrests or ordinary searches of personal property and dwellings.  
Therefore, the general judgment that a traditional search or seizure is per se 
unreasonable in the absence of probable cause or a warrant does not 
necessarily apply.187 
Justice William Brennan stated some of the case for the biometric 
exception when he wrote for the Court in Davis v. Mississippi188 that one 
biometric modality, fingerprinting, “involves none of the probing into an 
individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or 
search. . . . Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and 
effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or 
confessions . . . .”189  Retired Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, in 
an address delivered on the heels of the King decision, expressed his 
agreement with the result in King, in part on the theory that inasmuch as 
“taking a DNA sample reveals no information about the private, non-
criminal conduct of the object of the search, . . . taking a DNA sample—or 
a fingerprint sample—involves a far lesser intrusion on an ordinary 
person’s privacy than a search that allows an officer to rummage through 
private papers.”190  Although the notion of “no information” whatsoever is 
overstated,191 trawling crime scene databases for fingerprints or DNA 
matches has a lesser impact on bona fide Fourth Amendment interests than 
 
intelligence-gathering system is valid, reliable, and effective”); see also D.H. Kaye, Who 
Needs Special Needs? On the Constitutionality of Collecting DNA and Other Biometric Data 
from Arrestees, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 188, 193–94 (2006). 
185 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704–05 (1981). 
186 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1968). 
187 See Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 139, at 1098; 
Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 128–29. 
188 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969). 
189 Id. at 727. 
190 Justice John Paul Stevens (ret.), Address at American Constitution Society 
Convention at 15 (June 14, 2013), available at http://goo.gl/saIN9F. 
191 See David H. Kaye, Maryland v. King: The Tenth Justice (Stevens) Votes, FORENSIC 
SCI. STATISTICS & LAW (June 15, 2013), http://goo.gl/lXaCFo. 
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traditional searches.192  Consequently, the case for an exception to the per se 
rule is substantial. 
Although Maryland mentioned this possibility in its petition for 
review,193 neither side referred to it again, and the Court did not consider it.  
This was unfortunate.  An exception within the PSUWE framework would 
have a supplied a sturdier basis for upholding DNA-BC—or alternatively, 
for explaining why DNA collection and analysis does not qualify for the 
exception when fingerprinting, photographing, and noting distinguishing 
features like tattoos do qualify (or are of so little concern to the security of 
the person and his property as to escape the attention of the Fourth 
Amendment entirely). 
The Kennedy majority saw no convincing reason to distinguish 
between DNA on the one hand and the older modalities on the other.  In 
response, Justice Scalia’s dissent sought to distinguish the latter three 
practices from collecting a person’s DNA on the grounds that they either 
are not considered searches or that they are not systematically used to 
associate an arrested individual with a different (past or future) crime.194  
These distinctions, however, are overdrawn.  First, the search/no-search 
dichotomy in Fourth Amendment law does not differentiate DNA typing 
from fingerprinting.  That is, the threshold question of whether something is 
a search should not be answered one way when police force an individual to 
undergo fingerprinting for inclusion in a database and a totally different 
way when they compel the person to submit a DNA sample for a database 
profile.195  Both actions should be considered searches.  Furthermore, the 
search/no-search classification is binary.  Two information-gathering 
practices can be nearly the same in their impact on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests yet wind up on different sides of the dotted line.  
Merely asserting that one activity is a “search” and another might not be 
does not establish that they are dramatically different.196 
Second, the dissent’s claim that fingerprint databases are not 
systematically used to catch criminals does not reflect current reality.  
Justice Scalia’s evidence to the contrary is based on an obvious misreading 
 
192 See Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1133–39; David H. Kaye, 
DNA Database Trawls and the Definition of a Search in Boroian v. Mueller, 97 VA. L. REV. 
IN BRIEF 41, 46–49 (2011) [hereinafter Kaye, DNA Database Trawls and the Definition of a 
Search]. 
193 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Maryland v. King, No. 12-207, cert granted, 133 S. Ct. 
1958 (2013). 
194 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1986–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
195 Justice Scalia’s approach to defining searches admits of no such distinction.  See 
David H. Kaye, Maryland v. King: The Dissent’s Ten Second Rule, FORENSIC SCI. 
STATISTICS & LAW (Nov. 29, 2013), http://goo.gl/9MhQOk. 
196 See id. 
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of an FBI publication.197  Latent-print analysts routinely trawl databases 
populated with arrestee prints for “cold hits.”198  These cases received more 
publicity when they were novel, but they continue to be reported,199 and the 
FBI searches new arrestee “prints coming in every day” for leads in 
unsolved cases.200 
It is true that the original or primary motivation for amassing large 
arrestee fingerprint databases was not to trawl them for matches to latent 
prints from crime scenes.  It was to ascertain whether an arrestee’s prints 
already were in the database as a result of a previous arrest.  To that extent, 
arrestee DNA profiling differs from arrestee fingerprinting.  DNA profiling 
always had criminal intelligence gathering as its primary purpose.  
Although that also is a major purpose of arrestee fingerprinting today, it 
was not always so. 
This history may be significant in deciding whether to balance under 
the special needs line of cases, but it is not germane to deciding whether to 
consider a categorical exception for collecting biometric data for that very 
purpose.  The rationale for the general biometric-data exception is that 
association-identification is an important function that can be performed 
without impermissibly infringing on interests that the Fourth Amendment 
protects.  To say that some biometric identifiers (such as photographs) can 
be acquired without “searching” and that others (such as fingerprints) can 
be acquired for authentication-identification (and then used for the 
 
197 Id.; see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: 
INTEGRATED AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IAFIS)/NEXT GENERATION 
IDENTIFICATION (NGI) REPOSITORY FOR INDIVIDUALS OF SPECIAL CONCERN (RISC), 
http://goo.gl/Oj0YNs (last visited May 28, 2014).  
198 ILL. STATE POLICE, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (Oct. 2003), 
http://goo.gl/ZSCp4r (reporting 21,407 trawls and 6,065 hits from 1989 through 2003); IND. 
STATE LAB. DIV., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2013), http://goo.gl/N18NIE (reporting “183 
AFIS hits in 2013 even though the system was down for several months due to being 
updated”); WASH. STATE PATROL, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (Apr. 
2012), http://goo.gl/8ZlDcP (reporting that “more than 600 identifications have been made in 
Washington State”); see also Kaye, supra note 195; Kaye, supra note 48, at 44 n.38 
(collecting statistics indicating that thousands of fingerprint database trawls occur annually 
in active and cold cases combined); E-mail from Stephen G. Fisher, Jr., FBI Criminal Justice 
Info. Services, to author (Apr. 15, 2014) (on file with author) (reporting that “[d]uring Fiscal 
Year 2013, the IAFIS [Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System] received 
nearly 220,000 latent searches from the latent user community”). 
199 See, e.g., Brian R. Ballou, Fingerprint Technology Credited for Cold Case Arrest, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 2011, at B12; Summer Moore, Family Says Prints Led to Man’s 
Arrest, AUGUSTA CHRON., June 5, 2012, at 1A; Dean A. Radflord, Arrest Made in ’78 Cold 
Case, RENTON REPORTER, Sept. 23, 2011, at 3; Kevin Valine, Fingerprints Lead to Arrest in 
Robbery, FORENSIC MAG. (Nov. 21, 2013, 11:01 AM), http://goo.gl/64krsd. 
200 Adam Vrankulj, NGI: A Closer Look at the FBI’s Billion-Dollar Biometric Program, 
BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (Nov. 4, 2013), http://goo.gl/7v7IsF. 
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secondary purpose of association-identification) says next to nothing about 
whether a proposed exception to the requirement for a warrant and probable 
cause for collecting and using certain biometric-identifiers should include 
DNA profiles. 
That judgment depends on whether the state’s interests in having these 
identifiers—for criminal intelligence as well as authentication—outweigh 
the Fourth Amendment interests of individuals.  Whether the criminal 
intelligence function is called primary or secondary, it is equally important 
and legitimate.  Therefore, the dissent’s effort to distinguish DNA from 
other biometric identifiers, even if it were more accurate, would fall short of 
what would be needed to defeat the argument for a categorical exception.  
To justify denying the exception to CODIS profiles, one would have to 
demonstrate that DNA sampling, as regulated by the statute, is substantially 
more invasive of legitimate individual interests than is collecting the other 
types of biometric data.201  As indicated in Part III, arguments to this effect 
can be made, but the dissent did not even try.202 
III. MORE TO COME 
To this point, I have probed the place of King in the convoluted 
analytical framework for determining the reasonableness of searches and 
seizures.  I have argued that King neither dismantles this framework nor 
radically changes it.  Furthermore, I have suggested that the majority 
opinion would have been more convincing had it candidly endorsed the 
value of arrestee databases in solving crimes for their own sake rather than 
as a mere device to assist in pretrial decisionmaking, and I elucidated two 
possible doctrinal paths to this more comprehensive balancing.203 
Having elucidated the logic of King, I turn now to the implications that 
this logic (and the alternatives that I have sketched) holds for DNA-BC as 
 
201 Any suggestion that association-identification is necessarily more invasive of 
legitimate individual interests than is authentication-identification would be untenable.  As 
much as an individual might want to cloak his presence at a crime scene as a “private fact,” 
see Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 512–
15 (2007), the interest in not being caught carries no weight, see Kaye, A Fourth Amendment 
Theory, supra note 123; Kerr, supra, at 511 (discussing cases dismissing “the mere 
expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the 
authorities” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
202 See David H. Kaye, Maryland v. King: When Being Smart and Witty Isn’t Enough, 
FORENSIC SCI. STATISTICS & LAW (Nov. 27, 2013), http://goo.gl/QQmisR. 
203 As shown in Part II, the Court could have included the normal evidence-producing 
value in the balancing by clarifying or eliminating the overbroad primary purpose limitation 
on the special needs exception to the rule of per se unreasonableness.  Alternatively, the 
value could have been considered at an earlier stage, by examining whether there should be a 
new categorical exception for purely biometric data that includes DNA profiles. 
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practiced in other jurisdictions and as it might be implemented in the future.  
The facts in King make for a narrow holding.  The DNA sampling was 
confined to violent crimes and burglaries; officials had no discretion to pick 
and choose which arrestees’ DNA to acquire; a physical intrusion into the 
body took place; the loci tested revealed no sensitive medical or other 
privacy-laden information; the state trawled the forensic index (of unsolved 
crime scene profiles) only for matches to the arrestee (and not for partial 
matches that might point primarily to immediate relatives); the profiling 
and uploading occurred after formal charges; and the samples are destroyed 
if a conviction does not ensue.  But which of these factors are actually 
critical to the Court’s conclusion that the Fourth Amendment allows DNA-
BC? 
A. NONCODING LOCI AND STATUTORY PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
The King Court referred to “scientific and statutory safeguards” that 
ensured that there was no “significant invasion of privacy that would render 
the DNA identification impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.”204  
“Safeguards” is an appropriate term—in the long-term, neither science nor 
law can afford absolute protection against the discovery of information in 
which an individual has a reasonable claim of secrecy.  They can, however, 
go a long way toward that goal. 
On the scientific side, ever since “DNA fingerprinting” burst onto the 
forensic scene in the mid-1980s,205 government authorities and scientists 
have assured us that the DNA variations (alleles) at the locations (loci) used 
to create identifying profiles for the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System 
(CODIS) are pure junk206—they do not encode proteins,207 they have no 
 
204 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
205 See DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 262 (2010). 
206 See, e.g., Kirk E. Lohmueller, Letter to the Editor, Graydon et al. Provide No New 
Evidence that Forensic STR Loci Are Functional, 4 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 273, 273 
(2010); N.Y. STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES 2012, at 5, 
http://goo.gl/8xhRzT (last visited May 29, 2014) (“The pieces of DNA that are analyzed for 
the databank were specifically chosen because they are ‘junk DNA.’”); WASH. STATE 
PATROL CODIS LAB., THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM (Jan. 2012), http://goo.gl/HavkZi 
(“The regions of DNA tested are non-coding and are often referred to as ‘junk DNA’ 
because they don’t code for anything in particular and don’t yield medical information.”). 
207 See, e.g., H. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE DNA ANALYSIS BACKLOG 
ELIMINATION ACT OF 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(1), at 27 (“[T]he genetic markers used for 
forensic DNA testing . . . show only the configuration of DNA at selected ‘junk sites’ which 
do not control or influence the expression of any trait.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT REPORT: THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM, at 51 (Sept. 
2001), available at http://goo.gl/RZrqN1 (“These areas are considered junk DNA because 
they do not ‘code’ for anything (i.e., the DNA does not translate into a personal identifying 
characteristic like ‘blue eyes’ or into a genetic predisposition for disease).”). 
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known associations with diseases or behavioral traits,208 and they contain no 
information beyond an arbitrary identifier.209  The Court espoused this view 
when it wrote that “[t]he CODIS loci are from the non-protein coding junk 
regions of DNA, and ‘are not known to have any association with a genetic 
disease or any other genetic predisposition.  Thus, the information in the 
database is only useful for human identity testing.’”210 
This reasoning is oversimplified.  That STRs do not encode proteins 
does not necessarily mean that they cannot possibly affect the quantity or 
timing of gene expression or that they are entirely uncorrelated with DNA 
sequences that are expressed.  Moreover, CODIS loci certainly can be used 
to make inferences about a few family relationships and to give rough 
indications of biogeographic ancestry.211  Nevertheless, even though the 
majority’s brief description omits such nuances, the factual premise that the 
particular sequences used in CODIS databases neither cause nor are 
strongly predictive of any medical conditions or other traits is warranted.212  
The current loci seem to be devoid of significant information on health 
status.  As a result, the “scientific safeguard” of choosing only such 
vacuous loci for human identity testing is effective, at least for now. 
But what if future research falsified this premise by finding some 
variations at one or more CODIS loci to be predictive of some trait 
possessed by some individuals whose profiles reside in a database?213  
According to the King Court, “[i]f in the future police analyze samples to 
 
208 H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(1), at 27 (“DNA profiles generated in conformity with the 
national standards do not reveal information relating to any medical condition or other 
trait.”); DNA—Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal 
Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,932, 74,933 (Dec. 10, 2008) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 28) (DNA 
profiles “do not disclose an individual’s traits, disorders, or dispositions”). 
209 H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(1), at 27 (“By design, the effect of the system is to provide a 
kind of genetic fingerprint, which uniquely identifies an individual, but does not provide a 
basis for determining or inferring anything else about the person.”); DNA—Sample 
Collection, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,933 (“DNA profiles that are entered into CODIS . . . amount 
to ‘genetic fingerprints’ that can be used to identify an individual uniquely . . . .”). 
210 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013). 
211 See Brief of Genetics, Genomics and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Neither Party, at 2–3, King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (No. 12-207).  Furthermore, using 
the phrase “junk regions” invites confusion with the venerable but subtle theory that the 
specific base-pair sequences in many stretches of DNA have no effect on individuals’ 
reproductive fitness even if the “junk regions” have some evolutionary importance.  See id. 
at 25; see also David Kaye, “Open to Dispute”: CODIS STR Loci as Private Medical 
Information, FORENSIC MAG. (May 28, 2014, 8:27 AM), http://goo.gl/BasjLY. 
212 See Brief of Genetics, supra note 211, at 37. 
213 CODIS profiles can be used to detect trisomies (an extra chromosome), but these 
conditions are either fatal or grossly apparent.  See id. at 15 n.10; D.H. Kaye, Please, Let’s 
Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private Information, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 70, 77 n.34 (2007). 
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determine, for instance, an arrestee’s predisposition for a particular disease 
or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity, that case would present 
additional privacy concerns not present here.”214  In contemplating such 
trait-identification, it should be clear that the magnitude of those concerns 
would depend on the trait.  For example, if individuals with one allele had 
predictably larger hands or longer eyebrows than those with other alleles, 
there would no cause for concern.215  These are not especially private traits.  
Less visible traits—say, slight differences in the size of the vermiform 
appendix—also may be inconsequential; hence, using coding loci that 
convey information about traits like these would not be objectionable.  
Furthermore, even loci that are clinically relevant might not create a 
meaningful threat to privacy.  Suppose, for example, that a locus affected 
the metabolism of drugs used to treat a rare neurological disorder—
individuals with one allele would be good candidates for one drug therapy, 
but other patients would do better with a second drug.216  It is not obvious 
how including this locus in a database profile would present a meaningful 
privacy concern.  Police could not use the clinically relevant aspect of the 
DNA sequence to hurt or help anyone in the database.  Consequently, 
“hereditary factors” that go beyond identification might present no 
meaningful privacy concerns, and the “additional privacy concerns” would 
be a feather on the balance. 
But many inherited traits are far more problematic.  Suppose that a 
CODIS locus unexpectedly turns out to reveal highly sensitive medical 
information—for example, that an individual is almost surely a carrier of a 
life-threatening, recessive, hereditary disease such as Meckel-Gruber 
syndrome or is at an elevated risk for a particular mental illness.  The 
simplest way to restore the previous level of scientific safeguards would be 
to retire this locus from the CODIS system.217  Moreover, even under this 
 
214 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979. 
215 Yet, a brief written by Brandon Garrett and Erin Murphy and signed by twelve other 
law professors presented DNA tests for “sex, relatedness, eye color, hair color, and 
continental ancestry” as well as “freckles, moles, curly hair, skin color, earlobe shape, [and] 
body height.”  Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 39, King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (No. 12-207).  These tests were supposedly good 
examples of the “intrusive nature” of DNA technology, id. at 36, and the disturbing “secrets 
that a DNA sample can unlock” id. at 38.  Most of these “secrets” do not seem either 
“secret” or “intrusive.”  As Judge Carlos Lucero observed, even if DNA database samples 
were mined for clues as to visible traits, the information could not be considered deeply 
private.  See United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1230 (9th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J., 
concurring), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761, 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
216 Less hypothetically, one’s ABO blood group is vital information for blood 
transfusions, but it does not raise a grave privacy concern. 
217 Dropping a locus would reduce the statistical power of a database match, but with the 
impending expanded set of CODIS loci, see Douglas R. Hares, Letter to the Editor, 
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worst-case scenario, the constitutional calculus might not change—if there 
are sufficient “statutory protections.”218  In this regard, the Court quoted 
language in Whalen v. Roe219 about the salutary effect of “a statutory or 
regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.”220  Because of such 
protections and a history devoid of privacy breaches, the Whalen Court 
rejected a constitutional challenge to a New York database of everyone’s 
prescriptions for controlled substances.  If a state can be trusted to 
safeguard a database that records who is actually taking psychotropic 
medications, how can it not be trusted to safeguard a database that merely 
hints at who might need these medications? 
At present, the statutory protections against unauthorized disclosure 
(to insurers, employers, or anyone else) help assure that the DNA sample 
from which the medically uninformative identification profile is obtained is 
not used to infringe legitimate individual interests.221  If this assurance is 
sufficient for that purpose—if, as a multitude of courts have held, we can 
trust the government not to genotype samples for health-related loci or to 
release these samples to insurers or employers222—then it is not obvious 
why the Court should not also trust the government to avoid disclosing the 
alleles that comprise the identification profile.  In any event, if biomedical 
research changes the usable information content of DNA profiles, it will be 
necessary to rebalance the possible invasion of individual interests in 
medical privacy against the value of the database to the government.  In 
doing so, the Court should attend to the nature and social significance of the 
new information in the profiles as well as the efficacy of the statutory 
safeguards.  And in rebalancing, it would be fallacious to assume that all 
relationships between a locus and a phenotype automatically render the 
 
Expanding the CODIS Core Loci in the United States, 6 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS e52 
(2012), there is more than enough power to discriminate among individuals, at least “for 
single-source profile comparisons and international data sharing,” Jianye Ge et al., 
Developing Criteria and Data to Determine Best Options for Expanding the Core CODIS 
Loci, 3 INVESTIGATIVE GENETICS 1, 1 (2012).  Even so, altering the CODIS loci is not a step 
to be taken lightly. 
218 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980. 
219 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977). 
220 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
221 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY §§ 2-505(b), 2-506 (LexisNexis 2011); D.H. 
Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal DNA Databanks, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 259, 276–84 (2006). 
222 A lack of adequate safeguards would undermine the many cases upholding DNA 
sampling after conviction. 
2014] WHY SO CONTRIVED?  577 
system unreasonable.223  Much depends on the predictive value of the locus 
and the particular phenotype. 
B. FROM “SERIOUS OFFENSES” TO UNIVERSAL COVERAGE 
1. The Seriousness of an Offense 
California’s popularly enacted Proposition 69 extends DNA-BC to “all 
felonies, including simple drug possession, joyriding, unlawfully subleasing 
a car, or taking $250 worth of nuts from an orchard”224—a point that the 
American Civil Liberties Union is pressing in a case reargued twice en 
banc, then remanded, in the Ninth Circuit.225  The federal DNA database 
law is even more capacious.  It covers all offenses for which a custodial 
arrest is made, no matter how trivial the transgression.  Parking illegally on 
federal land or water skiing in a prohibited area is enough to permit an 
arrest.226  How vulnerable are these laws to Fourth Amendment challenge? 
The King majority cautioned that “the necessary predicate of a valid 
arrest for a serious offense is fundamental,”227 but the dissenters could not 
“imagine what principle could possibly justify this limitation . . . .”228  In 
the dissenters’ view: 
If one believes that DNA will “identify” someone arrested for assault, he must believe 
that it will “identify” someone arrested for a traffic offense.  This Court does not base 
its judgments on senseless distinctions.  At the end of the day, logic will out.  When 
there comes before us the taking of DNA from an arrestee for a traffic violation, the 
Court will predictably (and quite rightly) say, “We can find no significant difference 
between this case and King.”  Make no mistake about it: As an entirely predictable 
consequence of today’s decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national 
DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever 
reason.229 
A balancing test, however, leaves room for different outcomes.  
Although “[p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most 
 
223 Cf. generally David H. Kaye, Commentary, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks 
for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179 (2001) (arguing against a rule that would 
forbid the use of any and all coding loci). 
224 Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Supplemental Brief Re: Maryland v. King at 3, Haskell v. 
Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 10-15152) (citation omitted). 
225 See Haskell v. Harris, 745 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); see also People v. 
Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011), 
vacated, 302 P.3d 1051 (Cal. 2013) (ordering reconsideration in light of Maryland v. King). 
226 See United States v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1162 (9th Cir. 2013) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting). 
227 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013). 
228 Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
229 Id. 
578 DAVID H. KAYE [Vol. 104 
devious and dangerous criminals,”230 on average, people arrested for minor 
traffic offenses are less likely to be hiding their true identities and to have 
incriminating DNA samples at crime scenes than are people arrested for far 
more serious matters.231  Under free-form balancing, this is a logically 
relevant consideration.232  Whether this difference is significant enough to 
change the outcome is debatable of course,233 but the outcome is not 
“entirely predictable.”234 
 
230 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012). 
231 Cf. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974 (“Pretrial release of a person charged with a dangerous 
crime is a most serious responsibility.”  (emphasis added)). 
232 In Haskell v. Harris, the United States seemed to argue to the contrary:  
If the term “serious offense” did carry any meaning in King, . . . [it] includes any crime for which 
an individual is arrested and booked in police custody.  This meaning is logical, not only because 
the Court analyzed DNA fingerprinting as a “booking procedure,” but also because it analogized 
DNA fingerprinting to traditional “fingerprinting and photographing.”  
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 7–8, 
Haskell v. Harris, 745 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 10-15152) (citations omitted).  This 
“logic,” however, is specious.  That DNA sampling is a permissible part of the bookkeeping 
process for an individual placed in custody for offense A does not imply that it also is 
permissible for offense B unless B = A in all relevant respects.  There is no a priori logical 
reason to assume that all offenses are so fungible.  Similarly, even though DNA is like 
friction-ridge skin because both can be used to differentiate among individuals, it does not 
necessarily follow that the two identifiers are equivalent in other respects.  The real issue 
under King is whether the government’s interests in acquiring DNA profiles are so reduced 
with respect to lesser offenses that the government’s demand for the DNA is unreasonable.  
This is a question of practical reason, not of deductive logic or word games.  See David H. 
Kaye, Get Serious: The US Department of Justice’s Amicus Brief in Haskell v. Harris, 
FORENSIC SCI. STATISTICS & LAW (Dec. 6, 2013), http://goo.gl/7T2ZbU. 
233 Commentators who are critical of King tend to read the case broadly.  For example, 
Professor Murphy concludes that the Kennedy majority did not even “attempt[] to limit its 
holding” to serious crimes.  See Murphy, supra note 66, at 171.  Professor Elizabeth Joh 
thinks that “King does little to limit states from expanding the scope of their arrestee profiles 
to all arrestees, regardless of the severity of the offense.”  Elizabeth E. Joh, Maryland v. 
King: Policing and Genetic Privacy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 281, 289 (2013).  Judge Milan 
Smith, who wrote the panel opinion upholding California’s law before Maryland v. King, 
likewise concluded after King that DNA collection “is clearly constitutional as applied to 
anyone arrested for, or charged with, a felony offense by California state or local officials.”  
Haskell v. Harris, 745 F.3d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The remainder of the en banc court did not express an 
opinion on whether King’s approval of DNA-BC reaches beyond the specific felony offenses 
that trigger DNA collection in Maryland.  See David H. Kaye, The Ninth Circuit’s Minimal 
Opinion in Haskell v. Harris, FORENSIC SCI. STATISTICS & LAW (Mar. 22, 2014), 
http://goo.gl/Zo39NL (discussing the logic of the per curiam opinion). 
234 The right to trial by jury depends on the seriousness of the offense.  See, e.g., Baldwin 
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (crime punishable by six months’ imprisonment 
triggered the right).  It does not follow, however, that the requirement of a serious charge has 
the same content in other contexts.  See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (for 
the right to appointed counsel, “actual imprisonment [is] the line”). 
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2. The Necessity of an Arrest Founded on Probable Cause 
If the dissenting Justices were correct in lamenting that “your DNA 
can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if you are ever 
arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason,”235 and if a 
“wrongful” arrest means one without probable cause, then everyone could 
be rounded up (arrested on no basis whatsoever) and typed.  If such a case 
ever arose, and the dissenters did not have the votes to overrule King, they 
certainly would argue that King simply does not apply.  And they would be 
correct.  It would be perverse for any Justice to maintain that the 
government must be free to retain wrongfully acquired samples and profiles 
just because King holds that it is permissible to acquire these items from 
properly arrested individuals.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion plainly rests on 
the legitimacy of the arrest that prompted the DNA collection.236 
Suppose, however, that an encounter that prompts DNA sampling did 
not reach the point of a custodial arrest.  Briefly stopping a person on foot 
or in a vehicle to investigate suspicious activity is a seizure, but it does not 
require probable cause or a warrant.237  It has been said that King “invites 
(and nearly decides)”238 that DNA collection and on-the-spot profiling 
would be permissible to establish the true identity of the suspect and, 
presumably, to quickly trawl the DNA database of unsolved crimes (called 
a “forensic index”239).  However, this expansive reading of the majority 
opinion ignores the majority’s major justification for balancing—the lack of 
individual discretion in electing to take DNA from a custodial arrestee240—
and it presumes that the Court would see the balance as unchanged, even 
though (1) the government interests would be different241 and (2) the 
 
235 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
236 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (majority opinion) (stating that “once respondent’s DNA was 
lawfully collected the STR analysis of respondent’s DNA pursuant to CODIS procedures did 
not amount to a significant invasion of privacy that would render the DNA identification 
impermissible under the Fourth Amendment” (emphasis added)). 
237 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 30 (1968) (allowing the stopping and frisking of 
individuals on the street); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) 
(analogizing “the usual traffic stop” to a Terry stop rather than to custodial arrest that would 
trigger the protections of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). 
238 Joh, supra note 233, at 291. 
239 David H. Kaye, The Dictionary and the Database, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 389, 391 
(2013). 
240 See infra text accompanying note 265. 
241 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972 (“Second, law enforcement officers bear a responsibility for 
ensuring that the custody of an arrestee does not create inordinate risks for facility staff, for 
the existing detainee population, and for a new detainee.”  (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)); id. at 1973 (“Fourth, an arrestee’s past conduct is essential to an 
assessment of the danger he poses to the public, and this will inform a court’s determination 
whether the individual should be released on bail.”). 
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individual would have enhanced “expectations of privacy”242 outside of jail.  
Nevertheless, under the broader biometric-data exception, the Court could 
reach this result, at least for a conceivable technology that would generate 
DNA profiles, in a matter of minutes.  Some police departments use mobile 
fingerprint scanners to “help us ID folks who try to be misleading.”243  
Presumably, this demand for a suspect to cooperate in identifying himself 
via mobile fingerprint scanning is constitutional.244  If a mobile DNA 
scanner could perform the same function245 with no greater risk of sensitive 
trait-identification,246 why should its use be treated any differently? 
3. Programs for DNA Sampling Without Arrests or Stops 
Even if King does not invite the police to acquire samples wrongfully 
(and risk exclusion of the resulting evidence),247 what about a system that 
acquired DNA from everyone without trampling on their Fourth 
Amendment right to freedom from arbitrary arrests?  What if the state made 
DNA donation at the time of taking a driving test a condition for issuing a 
driver’s license?  What if neonatal screening tests for genetic conditions 
now performed as a public health measure (and thus permissible under a 
special needs analysis) were expanded to include STR profiling, with the 
identification profiles uploaded to law enforcement databases?  Police never 
would touch these samples (or the babies), but they could upload the 
profiles into databases encompassing entire local, state, or national 
populations.248  Universality would remove the disparate impact by race and 
 
242 Id. at 1979 (quoted in full infra text accompanying note 258).  However, the 
diminished expectations of privacy incident to extended detention flow from the fact that 
government has chosen to jail the suspect.  They should not be seen as an independent 
government interest.  See Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 124, at 1133. 
243 Bianca Cain Johnson, Fingerprint Scanner Paying Off for Richmond County Police, 
AUGUSTA CHRON. (June 17, 2013, 5:28 AM), http://goo.gl/eLvnvs. 
244 Cf. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186–87 (2004) (upholding 
punishment for failing to provide a name as required by a “stop and identify” statute). 
245 Such nearly instantaneous DNA scanners are still science fiction.  The fastest system 
for forensic STR profiling requires about ninety minutes to generate a profile.  See John W. 
Blackledge et al., Rapid DNA, 14 NAT’L ACAD. ASSOC. 14, 16 (May/June 2012), available at 
http://goo.gl/3mrJFd; Press Release, IntegenX® Announces First State-Wide Deployment of 
the RapidHIT® System with SmallPond™ at Arizona Department of Public Safety (May 13, 
2014), available at http://goo.gl/hj7Egz (“less than two hours”). 
246 On the limited value of CODIS loci for trait-identification, see infra Part III.A.  
Retaining the DNA sample would pose a possible threat to informational privacy, but such 
retention is no more necessary than is retaining a driver’s license produced in response to a 
police demand for identification. 
247 See infra note 272 and accompanying text. 
248 See David H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, 
Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 438; David 
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class that infuses a system in which acquisition of samples turns on contact 
with the police.249  It would intensify the level of public concern for and 
scrutiny of any abuses in the databases’ operation.250  It would enable police 
to start with a more complete list of individuals with matching DNA, 
avoiding the tunnel vision that can follow from too narrow a pool of initial 
suspects.251  It would render lingering arguments about population 
frequencies for DNA profiles and database search statistics252 essentially 
irrelevant.  It would largely obviate any need for local “DNA dragnets,”253 
“familial searches,”254 and small DNA databases operating independently of 
the statutorily specified state and national systems.255  It would be helpful in 
 
H. Kaye et al., Is a DNA Identification Database in Your Future?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5–9, 19 
(2001). 
249 The FBI reports that the distribution of arrests by race was 69.2% white, 28.4% black, 
1.5% Native American, and 0.9% Asian or Pacific Islander.  FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2011, at tbl.43A, http://goo.gl/g9UYgb.  Blacks compose about 13.6% of the U.S. 
population.  THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2011), 
http://goo.gl/xZvRxI.  Thus, an African-American faced about twice the risk of being 
arrested as would be predicted for a system in which arrests and race were entirely 
uncorrelated.  This disparity is less pronounced, however, than that for blacks sentenced to 
prison.  Almost 38% of all convicted prisoners were black—a considerably higher 
proportion than that for arrestees, according to the figures in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2011, at 7 tbl.7 (2012). 
250 See Paul M. Monteleoni, Note, DNA Databases, Universality, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 274 (2007). 
251 See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision 
in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292 (“A theme running through almost every 
[exoneration] . . . is the problem of tunnel vision . . . that lead[s] actors in the criminal justice 
system to focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will build a case for 
conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away from guilt.” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
252 See, e.g., People v. Koua Xiong, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877, 886–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); 
Derr v. State, 73 A.3d 254, 275–78 (Md. 2013); David H. Kaye, Trawling DNA Databases 
for Partial Matches: What Is the FBI Afraid Of?, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 153 
(2009). 
253 See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or 
Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 443–45 (2001). 
254 Compare Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 291 (2010) (arguing that trawling DNA databases to locate a relative who 
might be the source of crime-scene DNA that partially matches a DNA profile in the 
database is unconstitutional and problematic), with Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The 
Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248 (2006) 
(discerning fewer fundamental problems with such near-miss searching), and David H. 
Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial Searching,” 51 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (2013) (arguing that the practice, if implemented carefully, is 
constitutional). 
255 See Joseph Goldstein, Police Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 13, 2013, at A1.  To the extent that the national system lags behind state-of-the-art 
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cases of identifying bodies (or body parts) that might be from missing 
persons in isolated cases or in mass disasters.  Although it may be a 
nonstarter politically, the case for a population-wide database is not 
frivolous.256 
At this point, however, the Justices have stayed as far away as possible 
from suggesting or endorsing any such possibility.  At oral argument 
several Justices questioned counsel for Maryland intently on how a ruling 
could be confined to lawbreakers, and the state and federal government 
tried to assure the Justices that they need not adopt reasoning that would 
imply that a population-wide database would pass constitutional muster.257  
The majority then took pains to confine its reasoning to arrestees.  Justice 
Kennedy wrote: 
[T]he search here at issue differs from the sort of programmatic searches of either the 
public at large or a particular class of regulated but otherwise law-abiding citizens that 
the Court has previously labeled as “‘special needs’” searches.  When the police stop 
a motorist at a checkpoint or test a political candidate for illegal narcotics, they 
intrude upon substantial expectations of privacy.  So the Court has insisted on some 
purpose other than “to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” to justify 
these searches in the absence of individualized suspicion.  Once an individual has 
been arrested on probable cause for a dangerous offense that may require detention 
before trial, however, his or her expectations of privacy and freedom from police 
scrutiny are reduced.  DNA identification like that at issue here thus does not require 
consideration of any unique needs that would be required to justify searching the 
average citizen.  The special needs cases, though in full accord with the result reached 
here, do not have a direct bearing on the issues presented in this case, because unlike 
the search of a citizen who has not been suspected of a wrong, a detainee has a 
reduced expectation of privacy.258 
The Court’s claim that the primary purpose limitation on the special 
needs exception does not apply because arrestees have “a reduced 
 
techniques for coping with mixed crime scene samples and kinship searches or has slow 
response times, however, local databases might remain attractive.  See, e.g., Ben Finley, 
Bensalem Police Try Rapid DNA Testing, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 20, 2013, at B3.; Press 
Release, SmallPond Announces LODIS Migration Program (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://goo.gl/nEp19F; Press Release, supra note 245. 
256 Akhil Reed Amar, A Search for Justice in Our Genes, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at 
A31; Kaye & Smith, supra note 248, at 439–40; Kaye et al., supra note 248, at 6; Richard 
Lempert, Maryland v. King: An Unfortunate Supreme Court Decision on the Collection of 
DNA Samples, BROOKINGS INST. (June 6, 2013, 11:38 AM), available at 
http://goo.gl/xAT64S; Michael Seringhaus, Op-Ed, To Stop Crime, Share Your Genes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, at A23. 
257 See David H. Kaye, The Oral Argument in Maryland v. King—Part I, FORENSIC SCI. 
STATISTICS & LAW (Mar. 2, 2013), http://goo.gl/yHPeL4. 
258 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013) (internal citations omitted). 
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expectation of privacy” is vacuous.259  To be sure, arrestees may be 
searched in ways inapplicable (thankfully) to people who are not in police 
custody.  For example, more thorough searches for weapons or evidence 
can be conducted at detention facilities.260  But the existence of special 
interests in jail security and the search incident to arrest exception to the per 
se rule do not render the arrestee’s interests in being free from DNA 
sampling and profiling any different from the same interests prior to arrest.  
The argument that arrestees are in a unique category just because they have 
been arrested is an empty tautology.  The only relevant distinction between 
arrestees and the rest of the population is that the state’s interests in 
acquiring profiles and trawling for matches are greater in the case of 
arrestees.  The individual’s interests are no less. 
Thus, the gravamen of the majority opinion is that an arrest itself 
brings to bear a dominant set of state interests relating to pretrial 
supervision.  By definition, these interests are not applicable to individuals 
who never have been arrested—even if these other individuals are equally 
likely to be traceable through DNA from crime scenes.  In addition, 
arrestees may differ from the general population to the extent that arrestee 
DNA is more likely to be productive in generating matches than is 
nonarrestee DNA.  To that extent, arrestee DNA is especially valuable for 
the pretrial processing on which the King majority rested its hat, further 
supporting the view that King’s reach extends no farther than to properly 
arrested individuals. 
This is so even though the dissent was correct to maintain that the 
pretrial supervision rationale was practically fictitious as applied to the 
particular facts and timing of the belated DNA trawling in King.  The Court 
could have written an opinion that approved of DNA-BC only in 
jurisdictions that processed samples very quickly or only in those cases in 
which the processing was speedy enough to maximize all the potential 
benefits that the Court ascribed to a DNA-BC program.  The majority 
settled on a broader but more easily administered rule to make DNA-BC 
practical in a world with variations in the effectiveness of these programs 
across jurisdictional space and over time.  Although this result seems to 
give states that currently are taking months to process arrestee samples a 
free ride, the majority maintained that even long delays in processing these 
 
259 As explained supra Part II.C, this limitation on special needs balancing should not 
apply for a different reason.  The limitation should not apply because it is inconsistent with 
the raison d’être of the special needs exception.  The exception exists because the normal 
calculus of state and individual interests that undergirds the per se unreasonable rule is 
inapposite whenever the state has more than the normal interest in finding evidence of 
criminality for the purpose of investigation or prosecution. 
260 See generally, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012). 
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samples did not make them useless.261  Thus, the Court’s rather generic 
approval of DNA-BC is defensible on the ground that it would be difficult 
to develop a workable basis for deciding just when a state is moving fast 
enough in processing arrestee samples to achieve enough of the pretrial 
benefits that the majority enumerated.  Moreover, although DNA 
processing backlogs are a perennial problem, they do come and go.262  With 
current technology, DNA testing can be a significant appurtenance to, if not 
an equal partner of, fingerprinting for pretrial supervision.263  Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion therefore empowers governments to adopt and 
implement legislation that could bring about this result, even if this 
outcome is not achieved immediately and in all cases. 
To extend the result in King to a population-wide system, however, the 
majority would have to move beyond its pretrial processing and supervision 
theory.  First, it would have to determine whether direct balancing should 
be used when the state advances only interests in developing evidence for 
use in criminal investigations, prosecutions, and some different ancillary 
purposes, such as locating missing persons.  Second, if the Court applied 
direct balancing (or special needs balancing, or balancing to decide whether 
DNA profiling belongs in a new categorical exception to the per se 
unreasonable rule), it would have to decide whether these interests 
outweigh those Fourth Amendment interests that would support an 
individual’s asserted right to keep DNA to himself.  Although a categorical 
exception should apply to a carefully designed and administered system, 
this conclusion is a judgment that depends on an assessment of facts about 
the nature and implications of DNA profiling and identification.  Pure 
logic—at least, the logic of the King opinion—does not dictate that the 
Court arrive at that endpoint.264  There is a reasonable argument for the 
 
261 Justice Kennedy wrote that DNA-BC is still useful for pretrial decisions even when it 
takes months to obtain results and even when an individual has been released pending trial.  
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974 (discussing the long period of detention that can precede conditional 
release of an arrestee and the possibility of revoking probation in light of a DNA match). 
262 See, e.g., Associated Press, FBI Lab Reduces DNA Case Backlog 87 Percent, 
FORENSIC MAG. (Sept. 25, 2012 8:00 PM), http://goo.gl/OT9Wnn; Melinda DeSlatte, State 
Police Crime Lab Wipes Out Case Backlog, FORENSIC MAG. (July 24, 2013, 11:19 AM), 
http://goo.gl/qAOm9G; Jason Stein & Ryan Haggerty, Backlog of DNA Cases Eliminated, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 22, 2010, at B1; Juan A. Lozano, Houston Praised for 
Handling of Rape Kit Backlog, NBCDFW.COM (Oct. 9, 2013, 7:08 AM), 
http://goo.gl/pqhYV1. 
263 See infra text accompanying note 293. 
264 But see Lempert, supra note 256 (“King is precedent for establishing a national DNA 
database since it is hard to imagine any principled distinction between King while he stands 
unconvicted and ourselves.  (The only salient difference, that an arrest requires probable 
cause, is too thin a reed for any but the most cynical to rest upon.)”).  Moreover, one explicit 
rationale of King does support universality.  Justice Kennedy wrote that “the identification of 
2014] WHY SO CONTRIVED?  585 
constitutionality of a population-wide database, but the King opinions do 
not make that argument. 
C. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION 
A key factor in the majority’s approval of direct reasonableness 
balancing was that “the search involves no discretion that could properly be 
limited by the interpo[lation of] a neutral magistrate between the citizen and 
the law enforcement officer.”265  In other situations, such as roadblocks for 
drunken driving, the uniformity or randomness of the impositions on 
affected individuals has been important.  If government officials were left to 
pick and choose among arrestees, the necessary “family resemblance” for 
engaging in direct balancing might be absent,266 and the DNA sampling 
should be impermissible under the usual per se rule for warrantless 
searches. 
Although DNA database statutes require collection and profiling for 
all individuals arrested for qualifying offenses, enormous discretion can be 
exercised in deciding whether to make an arrest.  As long as probable cause 
exists, police are free to arrest anyone just to obtain a DNA profile.  Such 
pretextual arrests are permitted under Whren v. United States.267  In Whren, 
plainclothes vice-squad officers in an unmarked car in a high-crime area 
followed a truck with two young men in it that sped off after sitting idle at 
an intersection for an unusually long time.  They overtook the truck and 
ordered the driver to pull over.  Approaching the driver’s window, the vice-
squad officer saw plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine.  
Charged with violating various federal drug laws, the two men argued that 
the police lacked even reasonable suspicion to think that they were engaged 
in illegal drug dealing activity and that the officer’s “asserted ground for 
approaching the vehicle—to give the driver a warning concerning traffic 
violations—was pretextual.”268 
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court unanimously rejected “any 
argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on 
 
an arrestee as the perpetrator of some heinous crime” could “prevent the grotesque detention 
of . . . innocent people.”  King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  One can say the same thing about identifying a nonarrestee as the perpetrator of a 
crime. 
265 Id. at 1969 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
266 I say “might be” because the Court did not question the status of Samson and Knights 
as direct balancing cases, even though police were free to decide whether or not to search the 
probationer or parolee.  Evidently, this particular feature, although important, is not essential 
to the requisite family resemblance.  See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846–47 
(2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 115 (2001). 
267 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
268 Id. at 809. 
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the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”269  “[T]hat the 
officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the 
traffic code . . . rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment . . . .”270  The same would be true of an arrest actually 
motivated by the desire to acquire a DNA profile.  Probable cause to believe 
that the individual committed a qualifying crime would render the arrest—
and the DNA collection—reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
Although the Whren doctrine of strictly objective cause is unnerving, 
the King majority’s position that a magistrate’s review would serve no 
purpose in confining police discretion as to DNA profiling is correct.  
Certainly, a judge should—and must—verify the existence of probable 
cause for an arrest to justify continued detention.271  But what 
individualized determination could the magistrate make about DNA 
profiling beyond the legislative classification that DNA from all people 
arrested for qualifying offenses is worth acquiring and analyzing?  Unlike 
the commonsense, practical judgment of whether the available information 
gives rise to probable cause to believe that a suspect committed a crime, the 
magistrate would have to identify, within the sets of people arrested for 
each qualifying offense, the ones who are sufficiently likely to have left 
DNA at another crime scene.  If the legislative classification is already 
reasonable, and if everyone who is arrested must provide a sample, then the 
magistrate has nothing left to decide. 
Furthermore, police may not have much incentive to arrest simply as a 
way to acquire a DNA sample.  First, they would have to be confident that 
they have probable cause for the arrest.  If the arrest is deficient, the DNA 
match that follows might have to be suppressed along with all derivative 
evidence.272  Second, in most jurisdictions, police and prosecutors have 
mechanisms to compel a suspect to submit to DNA testing on a lesser 
showing than probable cause to believe that the DNA would link the 
suspect to the crime being investigated.  These include grand jury 
subpoenas, nontestimonial court orders, and surreptitious DNA sampling.273  
 
269 Id. at 813. 
270 Id. at 819. 
271 See County of Riverside v. McLaughin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (requiring a judicial 
determination within forty-eight hours). 
272 See David H. Kaye, Drawing Lines: Unrelated Probable Cause as a Prerequisite to 
Early DNA Collection, 91 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1, 9–10 (2012). 
273 No court has treated collecting shed or inadvertently abandoned DNA as a search.  
See Albert E. Scherr, Genetic Privacy and the Fourth Amendment: Unregulated 
Surreptitious DNA Harvesting, 47 GA. L. REV. 445, 454 (2013).  Police acting without a 
warrant and without probable cause acquire DNA profiles from unsuspecting individuals by 
inviting them to lunch, Ray Delgado, How Cop Got DNA to Nail Rapist: She Got Suspect to 
Drink Soda, Then Snatched Straw, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 14, 2001, 4:00 AM), 
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The additional ability to arrest someone when unrelated probable cause is 
present might not produce a great uptick in warrantless DNA collection.274 
In short, from both doctrinal and practical perspectives, the power that 
Whren leaves with police to make pretextual arrests does not vitiate the 
Court’s reliance on the absence of discretion in deciding to collect DNA 
from an arrestee.  Doctrinally, the Court always has upheld programs of 
inventory searches that are justified by interests other than producing 
evidence in criminal investigations as long as they are performed uniformly 
rather than arbitrarily.275  DNA-BC, like any of these other programs, can 
be abused, but the problem of pretextual arrests for DNA is not so much 
more acute as to demand a different outcome. 
D. NO BODILY INTRUSION 
All the Justices seem to agree that the physical intrusion of buccal 
swabbing is minor.  Obviously, this fact is critical to the majority’s 
balancing.  But suppose that the dissent were correct in proposing that even 
the most trivial physical intrusion justifiably triggers its categorical rule.  A 
state could collect DNA even less intrusively.  At some point, would the 
collection fall below the threshold of oppressiveness required for a “search” 
to exist?  For example, the government might only ask for a hand to be 
placed on a sticky pad so that some cells would be deposited for analysis.  
The dissent might respond that the “proud men who wrote the charter of our 
liberties would [not] be so eager to [move their limbs] for royal 
inspection,”276 but neither would those “proud men” be so eager to have 
their pictures taken by a royal photographer, and photography itself does 
 
http://goo.gl/PDNktY; intercepting their plates at a restaurant, Paresh Dave, Grim Sleeper: 
Judge Allows DNA Evidence Gathered at Restaurant, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), 
http://goo.gl/mcgXUo; following them around in case they spit in a public place, 
Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429, 430 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007); having them sit in an 
armchair while being questioned, Raynor v. State, 29 A.3d 617, 621 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2011); sending them forms to return in an envelope that they might lick, State v. Athan, 158 
P.3d 27, 31–32 (Wash. 2007); keeping the mouthpiece from a breathalyzer into which they 
were required to blow, People v. Thomas, 200 Cal. App. 4th 338, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); 
and so on, see Amy Harmon, Lawyers Fight DNA Samples Gained on Sly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
3, 2008, at A1 (collecting instances of surreptitious DNA collection by police). 
274 Cf. Murphy, supra note 66, at 173 (“As a routine matter, officers during ‘stop-and-
frisks’ ask suspects to ‘voluntarily’ submit to swabbing.  Those arrested for low-level 
offenses are given the chance to ‘spit and acquit.’  Police during traffic stops lawfully 
request swabs to verify identity.  And of course any offender actually processed at the 
precinct has a mug shot and DNA sample taken as a matter of course—if the law does not 
explicitly allow genetic sampling, then police can simply swab the cuffs or cell.”). 
275 See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (automobile); Illinois v. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (arrestee’s shoulder bag). 
276 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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not even rise to the level of a search that requires justification under the 
Fourth Amendment.277 
Once DNA sampling is divorced from any intrusion into the body, the 
property invasion rule that has appealed to many of the Justices in the past 
few terms to handle GPS surveillance278 and dog sniffs279 becomes useless.  
One must either revert to the murky reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard of Katz v. United States280 or adopt a broader, ordinary language 
definition of a search followed by a balancing test.281  Inasmuch as Justice 
Scalia’s opinion in King relies entirely on a physical invasion to trigger the 
Fourth Amendment,282 it has nothing to say about the no-physical-intrusion 
manner of gathering DNA data.283 
E. OUTER-DIRECTED DATABASE TRAWLING (A.K.A. “FAMILIAL 
SEARCHING”) 
Maryland (and Washington, D.C.) explicitly prohibit trawling in a 
database for the purpose of detecting very close relatives who might be the 
source of the crime scene sample.  The Court noted this part of Maryland’s 
laws,284 but it did not consider whether this ban actually mattered in its 
balancing.285 
Although such “outer-directed” trawling has been criticized as a grave 
invasion of the privacy of individuals whose DNA is in the database as well 
 
277 See id. at 1986; cf. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (“The exterior of a 
car . . . is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a ‘search.’”). 
278 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
279 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). 
280 See Kaye, supra note 39, at 482 (arguing that the sensitivity of the information in the 
full genome suffices to make physical DNA sampling a search under Katz). 
281 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 134, at 210 (proposing a “proportionality principle” that 
“allows courts to modulate the cause needed to carry out physical and transaction 
surveillance depending on its intrusiveness”); see also Amar, supra note 45, at 769. 
282 At oral argument, Justice Scalia appeared impatient with questions about a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and told Mr. King’s counsel that “I wouldn’t have made the 
concession that you’ve made, that this case is about reasonable expectation of privacy. . . .  
[H]ere, there is a search.  You have a physical intrusion.  You—you pull a guy’s cheek apart 
and stick a—a swab into his mouth.  That’s a search, reasonable expectation of privacy or 
not.”  Transcript, supra note 28, at 34. 
283 Of course, if the Court were to adopt the categorical exception for biometric data to 
the per se rule and include DNA data within this exception, it would not be necessary to 
resolve the question of what defines a search.  DNA-BC would be constitutional even if it is 
a search, just as it would be constitutional if it is not. 
284 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013). 
285 Some hasty commentary on the day of the opinion saw the opinion as throwing into 
doubt the constitutionality of outer-directed database trawls.  See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, 
Supreme Court Thinks DNA Collection Is Awesome, Worth the Invasion of Arrestees’ 
Privacy, FORBES (June 3, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://goo.gl/Py3pra. 
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as that of their relatives,286 the argument seems weak that the practice, if 
implemented properly, is unconstitutional.  But untangling and assessing 
the argument requires careful attention to the impact of the practice on the 
interests of both the individual whose profile is in the database and the 
individual’s close relatives.  This is not the place to undertake that task.287  
Even if using “familial searching” software and following up on any leads 
to people outside the database were unconstitutional, that conclusion would 
not prevent the state from collecting and using DNA profiles from arrestees 
or convicted offenders with conventional software to generate normal hits 
within the database. 
F. PROFILING BEFORE CHARGING 
The King decision is limited to a system that defers DNA analysis until 
charges have been brought.  On the one hand, the dissent complained that 
this delay undercuts the majority’s claim that DNA-BC is for authenticating 
the identity of the arrestee.288  On the other hand, the majority seemed 
comforted by the existence of a judicial finding of probable cause to believe 
that the arrestee is guilty of an offense.  In particular, Justice Kennedy 
wrote that “[o]nce an individual has been arrested on probable cause for a 
dangerous offense that may require detention before trial, however, his or 
her expectations of privacy and freedom from police scrutiny are 
reduced.”289 
Although initially appealing, it is hard to see why a line of 
constitutional magnitude must be drawn at the point of a probable cause 
determination.  If what the Court meant by reduced “expectations of privacy 
and freedom” is that the state may subject a prisoner to other humiliating 
and privacy-reducing procedures, such as unannounced inspections of cells 
and strip searches, then its observation begs the question.290  That a person 
 
286 See Murphy, supra note 254, at 313–19; see also Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic 
Evidence, supra note 215, at 36–38 (arguing that pursuing leads to relatives through 
database trawls “may also harm, rather than help, innocent persons” and may reveal 
“sensitive information”). 
287 For one interest-based analysis, see Kaye, supra note 254, at 138–61. 
288 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1983 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Maryland officials did not even 
begin the process of testing King’s DNA that day [of the arrest].  Or, actually, the next day.  
Or the day after that.  And that was for a simple reason: Maryland law forbids them to do 
so.”). 
289 Id. at 1978 (majority opinion).  In at least one earlier case, the Court spoke of an 
arrest as reducing expectations of privacy.  United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 
(1977) (“Unlike searches of the person, searches of possessions within an arrestee’s 
immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by the 
arrest.” (internal citation omitted)). 
290 See supra text accompanying note 259. 
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loses some—even a great deal of—privacy because he is in custody merely 
(and obscurely) restates the conclusion that certain searches or seizures are 
permissible.  That conclusion does not automatically reduce the individual’s 
interest in maintaining other aspects of privacy.  Police may not rush out 
and search an arrestee’s apartment without a warrant just because he has 
numerically fewer “expectations of privacy and freedom” while in jail. 
Nonetheless, a finding of probable cause to hold an individual for trial 
does justify continued detention, and the state’s interests in detaining 
arrestees and bringing them to trial adds to the justifications for pretrial 
DNA testing.  For example, the majority reasoned that an individual’s 
commission of a crime—say, a brutal rape—unrelated to the arrest might 
increase his flight risk if he realized that a conviction would require him to 
provide a DNA sample under the state’s convicted offender DNA statute, 
thereby putting him at risk of a DNA match to the rape.291  If the individual 
is not charged after his arrest, however, this justification evaporates.  
Furthermore, to the extent people who are validly charged are more likely 
to have committed DNA-related crimes than are people who have been 
arrested but not validly charged, the state has a greater interest in trawling 
the crime scene profiles for possible matches. 
Consequently, a prosecutor’s decision to bring some charges and a 
judicial finding of probable cause are relevant.  But are they decisive?  A 
prosecutor may choose not to pursue a case even when there is probable 
cause, and a magistrate might mistakenly find that such cause is lacking 
even when it is actually present.  As a consequence, the state would lose the 
opportunity to discover whether the arrestee is linked to other crimes.  
Taking DNA and completing a database search immediately avoids this 
negative impact on the government’s interests.  As long as DNA sampling 
is minimally intrusive and the privacy interests in the identification profiles 
are weak, the net balance of state and individual interests does not seem to 
change substantially if the DNA sampling and analysis occur at or close to 
the initial booking,292 as it can with microfluidic technology.293 
 
291 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1973. 
292 Kaye, supra note 272, at 10–11.  
293 See generally Catherine Rivet et al., Microfluidics for Medical Diagnostics and 
Biosensors, 66 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING SCI. 1490 (2011) (explaining the technology).  On 
the application of the technology to forensic STR identification, see Andrew J. Hopwood et 
al., Integrated Microfluidic System for Rapid Forensic DNA Analysis: Sample Collection to 
DNA Profile, 82 ANAL. CHEM. 6991 (2010); Press Release, Bode Technology Offers First 
Rapid DNA Service Delivering a DNA Profile from Evidentiary Samples in Under 90 
Minutes (Aug. 27, 2012), http://goo.gl/PVrZwH; IntegenX Inc., RapidHIT System Approved 
to Upload DNA Profiles to National Database, FORENSIC MAG. (Mar. 19, 2014, 3:43 PM), 
http://goo.gl/ukhfJK. 
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G. RETAINING WITHOUT CONVICTING 
Finally, the King opinions do not address the reasonableness of 
retaining samples or profiles when a conviction does not follow the arrest.  
They did not have to, because Maryland law provides for the automatic 
destruction of samples and records in that situation.294  But what about a 
law that allows the state to retain the samples or profiles indefinitely, even 
in the absence of a conviction or without regard to the desires of the 
previously detained or convicted individual?  The United Kingdom 
followed this approach until the European Court of Human Rights ruled in 
2008 that indefinite retention of fingerprints and DNA profiles and samples 
violated the provision of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence.”295  That court concluded that “the 
permanent and indiscriminate retention of the fingerprint and DNA records 
of . . . persons suspected but not convicted of offences . . . constitutes a 
disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to respect for private 
life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society.”296  In 
response to this rebuke, England now limits retention of fingerprints and 
DNA profiles, in the absence of a conviction, to five years for certain major 
offenses and to two years or less for minor ones; DNA samples are to be 
destroyed within six months of being taken.297 
As with profiling and trawling before charging in the United States, 
however, continuing to trawl after charges are dropped or after a defendant 
is acquitted violates almost no legitimate Fourth Amendment interests.298  
When police show a mugshot of an arrested, but not convicted, defendant to 
a victim of an assault, they do not engage in a new search or seizure.  Nor, 
for that matter, do they deprive the never-convicted arrestee of due process 
 
294 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967.  Some other jurisdictions place the burden of requesting 
expungement on the individual.  See generally Valerie Werse, Note, A “Lengthy, Uncertain, 
and Expensive Process”: A Comparison of Types of Expungement from DNA Databases of 
Arrestees, 39 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 282 (2013).  Although this difference could 
have important practical consequences, it seems too slight to tip the scales against 
constitutionality.  Cf. Murphy, supra note 66, at 172 (“[I]n some respects the expungement 
debate seems absurdly academic.”). 
295 Regina (S) v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, [2004] UKHL 39, rev’d sub 
nom., S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 169 (citing European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.).  
296 S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 117 & 125. 
297 See Protection of Freedoms Act 2012: How DNA and Fingerprint Evidence Is 
Protected in Law (Apr. 4, 2013), http://goo.gl/cBEPRN. 
298 For efforts to canvass the relevant interests, see Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, 
supra note 123, at 1135–38; Kaye, DNA Database Trawls and the Definition of a Search, 
supra note 192, at 46–49. 
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of law simply because he is presumed innocent until found guilty beyond 
any reasonable doubt at trial.299  Nor, if the photo spread is not unfairly 
suggestive, do they violate due process, even though there is a risk of 
misidentification300—usually a much greater one than occurs with a DNA 
profile.301  Retaining and using the bare profile, then, seems permissible. 
However, it is more debatable whether retaining the physical samples 
creates an unreasonable risk of a harm that comes under the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment.  On the one hand, the state’s arguments for 
indefinite sample retention are far from compelling.302  On the other hand, it 
is not likely that police will look through the full genome for the kind of 
 
299 See David H. Kaye, Associational Privacy, the Presumption of Innocence, and 
“Corruption of Blood” as Constitutional Metaphors in the Debate on “Familial Searching,” 
AMER. CRIM. L. REV. BLOG: MENS REA (Nov. 26, 2012, 10:06 AM), available at  
http://goo.gl/80BzrO. 
300 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). 
301 See United States v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting) (“[N]o other investigative tool that we currently use, whether it be voice 
identification, fingerprinting, handwriting analysis, or any other scientific or semi-scientific 
method, . . . has nearly as good a record as CODIS.”).  Opponents of DNA-BC portray 
association-identification via DNA databases as error-prone or at least not error-free.  See, 
e.g., Murphy, supra note 66, at 192 (referring to “DNA typing’s own significant history of 
error—including mixed samples, incompetent analysts, unexpected transfer, and the like—
that has led to false accusations and even convictions”); Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic 
Evidence, supra note 215, at 25–36.  It is possible that a large number of innocent suspects 
have been put on trial and then convicted—and that these mistakes will never see the light of 
day.  See William C. Thompson, The Myth of Infallibility, in GENETIC EXPLANATIONS: SENSE 
AND NONSENSE 227, 229 (Sheldon Krimsky & Jeremy Gruber eds., 2013) (stating that “the 
errors we know about may be the tip of an iceberg of undetected or unreported errors”); 
William C. Thompson, Tarnish on the ‘Gold Standard:’ Understanding Recent Problems in 
Forensic DNA Testing, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 10–11 (repeating “the tip of an 
ominous iceberg” to describe what we know now).  One can write scenarios about crime 
scenes that have been contaminated by planted or inadvertently transferred DNA from 
innocent individuals who are nonetheless plausible suspects.  See, e.g., Henry K. Lee, How 
Innocent Man’s DNA Was Found at Killing Scene, S.F. CHRON. (June 26, 2013, 11:07 PM), 
http://goo.gl/5qEGlE (explaining that paramedics who had been called to a murder scene 
may have transferred DNA from a murder victim to another man they treated for intoxication 
hours before).  Moreover, identical twins or partly matching individuals could be implicated 
as a result of a poor crime scene sample that yields a very incomplete profile.  Nevertheless, 
although “a number of false cold hits” have been reported, Thompson, The Myth of 
Infallibility, supra, at 230, well-documented examples of false convictions from DNA 
database trawls are few and far between.  Cf. DNA Blunder: Man Accused of Rape After 
Human Error, BBC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2012, 8:40 PM), http://goo.gl/cw2bvz (detailing a case 
in which rape charges were dismissed following a false match caused by improper re-use of 
a plastic tray for robotic DNA extraction; subsequent investigation of 26,000 samples 
extracted with the robotic system revealed “no other cases of contamination”). 
302 See Kaye, supra note 221, at 298–99; David H. Kaye, Ninth Circuit Upholds 
Indefinite Retention of DNA Samples: But Why Retain Them?, FORENSIC SCI. STATISTICS & 
LAW (Aug. 19, 2013), http://goo.gl/TbT4t7. 
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information that health insurers might want to know or that they will release 
database samples to insurers or employers.  The King majority basically 
reasoned that statutory protections create a presumption that sensitive 
data—beyond the individual’s apparent link to a crime—will not be 
disclosed.303  This presumption of regularity suggests that continued 
retention is permissible.  Nonetheless, under the majority’s direct 
reasonableness standard, it also can be argued that the state has less reason 
to trawl crime scene databases for matches to people who never have been 
convicted of the offenses that result in their inclusion in offender or arrestee 
databases and who no longer are subject to pretrial detention or supervision.  
When one balances two sets of lightweight interests, the outcome will be 
close—but of no great moment. 
CONCLUSION 
Maryland v. King perpetuates doctrinal confusion over the necessary 
conditions for program-specific balancing.  The Court did not consider 
crafting a new exception for biometric data to the per se rule of 
unconstitutionality for warrantless searches.  Likewise, it apparently did not 
consider limiting the few cases that speak of a “primary purpose” 
requirement as a barrier to a richer, multiple-needs basis for balancing.  
Instead, it sought an opinion that would effect the least apparent change to 
the existing categorical exceptions to the need for a warrant and probable 
cause—by working outside that framework.  As a result, even though the 
Justices understood that DNA may solve unrelated cases, the majority 
strained to justify collecting DNA on grounds specific to pretrial detention.  
The Justices amassed as many pretrial state interests as they could find—
other than the most important one of prosecuting arrestees for other, and 
possibly more serious, crimes than those for which they were arrested. 
This strategy enabled the dissent to chastise the Court for a contrived 
defense of Maryland’s law.  But if the majority opinion was factitious, the 
dissenting opinion was superficial, substituting Fourth Amendment 
formalism for an assessment of the individual interests at stake.  The 
dissent’s theory of what the Amendment requires does not fit all the case 
law and should not prevent a state from adopting a bona fide multimodal 
system of biometrics—including DNA along with physical features—for 
identity authentication and subsequent criminal intelligence gathering made 
possible by modern databases. 
The King Court’s painfully constricted inquiry into direct 
reasonableness may have been adequate to resolve the case before it, but it 
leaves unresolved significant questions about the constitutional limits of 
 
303 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979–80 (2013). 
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DNA databases.  These questions would be more credibly handled by 
incorporating the criminal-intelligence benefits of DNA databases into the 
balancing test.  This balancing could occur either in the Court’s exceptions 
for special needs when programs do more than seek evidence about crimes 
or, better still, in the course of framing a categorical exception to the per se 
unreasonable rule for all biometric identifiers that are minimally invasive to 
Fourth Amendment interests and that substantially further the full range of 
state interests in collecting and using information on the distinguishing 
features of individuals.  Determining whether DNA identification systems 
fall into this categorical exception depends primarily on the safeguards that 
would curtail disclosure of data other than biological identity.  With 
sufficient safeguards, states and the federal government should be able to 
resolve, according to their legislative visions of public policy, the questions 
of which offenses should be used for DNA collection and how long samples 
and profiles should be retained. 
The categorical exception also would permit governments to step away 
from contact with police as the cornerstone of inclusion.  As a matter of 
fairness and utility, what justifies “singling out still innocent defendants for 
DNA testing and sparing the rest of us”?304  No one forfeits a right to keep 
one’s DNA to oneself—not even by reason of a criminal conviction.305  
Rather, the state can override an offender’s claim of a right not to release 
DNA because the governmental interests in detecting and deterring crime 
make the use of an offender’s DNA reasonable when it is useful or used 
strictly for authentication- and association-identification.  With innocent 
arrestees, however, the public gain is less, and the line between the arrested 
person and the rest of the innocent population is drawn in the faint ink of 
probable cause.306 
Although a population-wide DNA database is not on the political 
horizon (and may never be), the vision of universality should play a role, 
even in today’s arrest-based DNA-BC systems.  King confirms that states 
have the constitutional power to take DNA upon or shortly after arrest, not 
only for authentication-identification but also for association-identification.  
In developing systems of DNA-BC, “[l]egislators and database 
 
304 Lempert, supra note 256. 
305 Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 123, at 1133. 
306 Furthermore, “the police do not arrest innocent people at random.  Minorities appear 
particularly vulnerable. . . .  [B]lacks who have not committed the crime leading to their 
arrest are at greater risk than similarly innocent whites of being linked to another crime 
through DNA profiling.”  Lempert, supra note 256.  “Still the cure should be to arrest more 
white criminals and not to let other[s] who have committed crimes go free.  Moreover, since 
much crime is intraracial those saved from future rapes or killings will often have the same 
heritage as those captured.”  Id. 
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administrators should do unto others as they would to themselves.  They 
should not adopt or operate any DNA identification system unless they 
would be willing to include their own DNA in the system.”307 
This precept, applied with an appreciation of the nature of the actual 
threats to privacy, should advance law enforcement interests while still 
respecting valid privacy concerns.  Fingerprints, photographs, and DNA 
profiles each sometimes can be used to determine where someone was at 
some point in the past, and all these biometric traits possess some inherited 
features.308  Libertarians may instinctively resent and oppose the desire of 
governments to amass all the information they can, and policymakers of all 
persuasions should worry about the emergence of new surveillance and 
information systems.  But singly or in combination, the three biometrics are 
not the equivalent of Bentham’s panopticon—a building in which the 
locations and movements of everyone and everything are instantly and 
always visible—or of Orwell’s 1984—a world with two-way telescreens 
and hidden microphones in every home.  In using biometrics for some 
forms of “identification,” as defined in King, DNA (and other databases) of 
appropriate scope, cost, and efficacy can contribute to efforts to enforce 
criminal law without trampling legitimate interests in personal privacy. 
  
 
307 Kaye, supra note 48, at 48. 
308 See Brief of Genetics, supra note 211, at 36; Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, 
supra note 123, at 1135–36, 1141, 1152–53. 
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